



# Expanding Civil Society Contributions to the Governance Agendas of the Sustainable Development Goals and International Financial Institutions

By Vinay Bhargava, A. Edward Elmendorf, Simon Gray, Barbara Kafka, Daniel Ritchie and Sarah Little

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# FOREWORD

## Dear reader,

The [Partnership for Transparency \(PTF\)](#) is proud to present *Expanding Civil Society Contributions to the Governance Agendas of Sustainable Development Goals and International Financial Institutions*. The report examines the roles civil society plays in improving governance outcomes under [Sustainable Development Goal Number 16 \(SDG16\)](#) and International Financial Institution (IFI) policies, reviews the evidence on what works and what does not, and presents recommendations to establish and expand successful civil society-led programs. It provides stakeholders with a resource to understand the potential contribution of civil society and provides recommendations for how it can be realized.

PTF has been working to enhance governance and control corruption at the grassroots for nearly 20 years and is a partner of the [Transparency, Accountability and Participation \(TAP\) Network](#) – an international coalition of civil society organizations (CSOs) working towards SDG16 and Agenda 2030. PTF also advises IFIs on their governance, anti-corruption and stakeholder engagement policies and programs. The report is designed to contribute to TAP sponsored dialogues, including those related to the upcoming review of SDG16 at the UN's [2019 High-Level Political Forum \(HLPF\)](#), and PTF's ongoing work.

The report takes a deep dive into the successes and challenges of civil society contributions to good governance agendas. It highlights the rising citizen demand for more transparent and accountable government. It notes that governments and IFIs have responded positively by adopting targets for more transparent, accountable, participatory government. It would be naïve, however, to trust governments to deliver proactively on these promises without appropriate pressure. It is up to civil society to hold governments and development agencies accountable to their commitments

In the four years since the adoption of Agenda 2030, SDG16 implementation has been uneven at best, and will likely fail without proactive support for greater collaboration with civil society. As this report shows, CSO programs have engendered more transparency and accountability, reduced corruption and improved effectiveness of public service delivery in a variety of contexts. In other situations, CSO programs have not produced the desired outcomes. The research evidence offers recommendations for moving forward in light of these lessons. It concludes that an expansion of CSO programs would improve the prospects of achieving SDG16 governance targets. Such an expansion would be possible only through the support of governments, philanthropists, international NGOs, bilateral donors and IFIs. The report provides specific recommendations for their consideration.

Sincerely,



**Richard Stern**

*President, Partnership for Transparency (PTF)*



# **ABBREVIATIONS**

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development [United Kingdom]
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction & Development
HLPF	High Level Political Forum at the UN
IFI	International Financial Institution
IADB	Inter American Development Bank
IDA	International Development Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PTF	Partnership for Transparency Fund
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UN	United Nations
VNR	Voluntary National Reviews {of country SDG performance at UN}
WB	World Bank



# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## INTRODUCTION

Citizens worldwide are demanding more transparency, participation and accountability in government operations. The rising demand is fueled by the growth of digital communications, rapid urbanization, youth and women’s activism, and concerns about climate change and rising inequality. Governments have responded by adopting [Sustainable Development Goal 16 \(SDG16\)](#) targets for reducing corruption, making institutions accountable and responsive, promoting inclusive and participatory decision making and ensuring public access to information, among others. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have also included governance and controlling corruption in their corporate strategies and are assisting borrowing countries to do so. These commitments reflect the belief and evidence that improving governance and controlling corruption as necessary for the achievement of the entire [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development \(Agenda 2030\)](#).

Despite these commendable commitments, a common view is that good governance goals are “aspirational” and prospects for achieving them are slim. Governments are known to be more responsive to elites who keep them in power rather than to all citizens and are often reticent to being held accountable. This has led to low trust in government institutions to fight corruption. For example, 57% of the respondents surveyed for the [2017 Global Corruption Barometer Report](#) said their government is doing badly in fighting corruption and key government institutions are corrupt. This view is supported by cross-country governance indicators that demonstrate the state of governance and corruption has not changed substantially in the past two decades. Indeed, available data indicates that progress towards SDG16 so far is ‘uneven’ at best.

**Increased civic engagement is an important part of the solution to accelerate progress towards SDG16 and improve the effectiveness of IFI good governance and anti-corruption efforts.** Even when governments institute measures to improve governance, these often do not work as intended, be it because of capacity constraints, weak incentives or design loopholes. These so-called “supply side” measures should be complemented by a demand for accountability. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) represent, support and embolden the “demand side” of democratic governance—engendering greater citizen uptake, better feedback and truly independent oversight.

Civil society has demonstrated its ability to enhance governance and is increasingly being urged to do more. For example, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General notes in a [2019 Report on Progress towards the SDGs](#), “The adoption of the 2030 Agenda was a victory for international cooperation but most of all for the world’s people. The high-level gatherings in September 2019, including the SDG Summit, give us a moment to reflect on the first four years of this essential journey. Despite slow progress, I remain convinced that we can bring the Agenda’s inspiring vision to life on all fronts, multilateral action is essential. In

the [Rome Civil Society Declaration on SDG16+](#), thousands of worldwide civil society members of the [Transparency, Accountability and Participation \(TAP\) Network](#) have pledged to do their part, but have pointed out that complementary actions by key development partners that are needed for CSOs to maximize their contributions as called for in Agenda 2030.

**In this context, this paper takes a deep dive into how civil society can accelerate and maximize its contributions to achieving the good governance targets of Agenda 2030 and IFIs.** It submits seven recommendations for development partners, including CSOs, philanthropists, international NGOs, bilateral donors and IFIs to move from rhetoric to action. The paper examines roles for civil society to play in improving governance outcomes under SDG16 and IFI policies, reviews the evidence on what works and what does not, and presents recommendations for stakeholders to establish and expand successful CSO-led programs.

The authors acknowledge that national actions and budgets will be the primary determinant of progress in achieving SDG targets including those of SDG16. At the same time, IFIs play an important role in the development of low and middle-income countries, with the influence and resources to encourage borrowing countries to engage in CSO collaboration. As such, they can play a catalytic role in expanding CSO-led initiatives to improve governance, and have therefore been targeted in our analysis and recommendations.

## SDG 16 PROGRESS

**Reports on SDG16 progress indicate that the world is falling short.** Governments seem, by lack of evidence in their [Voluntary National Reporting \(VNR\)](#), to have given it relatively low priority. Due in large part to the lack of official information available, unofficial reporting on SDG16 progress has been undertaken by CSOs themselves, noting little progress at the global level. The upcoming [UN High Level Policy Forum \(HLPF\)](#) meetings in July and September 2019 are scheduled to review progress of SDG16 among others. Reports prepared in advance of the meeting confirm that progress is falling short.

**Civil society is a partner in Agenda 2030 and is expected to engage in the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs.** However, evidence suggests that CSOs have not been appropriately involved thus far. Common reasons given among CSOs contributing to the HLPFs have been that few governments have encouraged informed collaboration and few opportunities have emerged for CSOs to participate substantially in official national reporting mechanisms. This lack of meaningful CSO participation is corroborated by the VNRs submitted by 102 countries from 2016-18.

## RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE

**We reviewed more than 40 studies to distill information from hundreds of cases and sources on the primary factors influencing the effectiveness of civic engagement to improve governance. The evidence reveals that CSOs have been successful in producing positive governance outcomes, but this is highly dependent on context.**

In nearly every socio-political environment, there is the opportunity for engagement between civil society and government, if the program is adjusted to suit the context. Pathways for CSOs to contribute to SDG and IFI good governance agendas include:

- Right to information advocacy and monitoring
- Public expenditure tracking and participatory budgeting
- Holding the state accountable through third party monitoring
- Raising awareness of people's rights and entitlements
- Encouraging citizens to express voice during consultations
- Representing the poor in policy formulation at a local and national level
- Demanding transparency, accountability, and inclusive access to services
- Engaging constructively to improve public services delivery
- Improving effectiveness of grievance redress mechanisms
- Connecting with other CSOs to form coalitions

Our research indicates that successful civic engagement programs appropriately evaluate and address the following aspects of context:

- ***Access to and appropriate use of information.*** Qualitative and quantitative information is fundamental for civil society to judge whether services are being delivered satisfactorily and projects are being implemented appropriately. However, information is only useful if it is packaged in a way that permits the audience to comprehend what is being transmitted.
- ***Citizen knowledge & awareness.*** Multiple studies note the importance of citizen awareness. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) reviewed the lessons of 50 social accountability projects it supported, revealing they are more likely to succeed when citizens know their rights, be they the services to which they are entitled, procedures they can expect government agencies to follow or specifications for new infrastructure projects.

- **Engagement with public authorities.** To be effective, social accountability requires that CSOs engage constructively with government institutions and that the latter respond effectively to deficiencies identified. Interventions which help build an enabling environment and strengthen state responsiveness are more successful than those that only promote citizen voice.

## KEY INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

- 1) Context Matters. The exact same measure that works in one context may not work, without adaptation, in another.
- 2) In suitable contexts, positive outcomes are produced such as increased: transparency; access; community participation and empowerment; government responsiveness; implementation effectiveness; grievance redress; inclusion; accountability of the state; budget utilization; trust in public institutions; and reduced waste and corruption.
- 3) The strongest evidence of positive outcomes is found in public services delivery and public financial management.
- 4) Use of CSOs as intermediaries makes a significant difference in raising awareness, organizing collective action, facilitating constructive engagement with authorities, ensuring inclusion, and closing feedback loops.
- 5) Combining multiple social accountability tools and continuous engagement to enable collective action produces better outcomes than one intervention for a short period.
- 6) Closing the feedback loop is essential for positive outcomes to materialize.
- 7) In certain contexts, negative outcomes can occur, such as token participation, reprisals and/or denial of service, elite capture, violent state response, community disenchantment.
- 8) Success at local levels has seldom led to change and institutionalization at sub-national and national program levels.

**Source:** *These insights are compiled by PTF based on literature review involving more than 40 studies and meta-studies containing synthesis of hundreds of other primary sources.*

## CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY-LED GOOD GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS

**Entry points for CSOs to promote good governance.** Civil society interaction with government counterparts has been most productive and successful in monitoring and reporting on: the delivery of public services which affect citizens directly, such as education, health, water supply and social protection; and public financial management. CSOs can make a greater contribution to the accomplishment of SDG16 governance targets in three ways:

- 1) ***Influence the design*** of government and IFI-funded programs by leveraging opportunities for consultations, advocacy, and participation in steering or advisory committees.
- 2) ***Engage actively*** in government programs to enhance results and development outcomes, including reduced corruption, citizen inclusion, participatory decision-making and increased transparency and accountability.
- 3) ***Monitor commitments*** made by governments and IFIs, track progress and hold them accountable for delivery by participating in multi-stakeholder review processes.

**Proven tools and methods.** Interventions that effectively facilitate civic engagement to improve the quality of service delivery include:

- Raising citizen awareness of their civil rights and responsibilities
- Building the capacity of citizens, CSOs and government agencies to work together constructively
- Training citizens to use social accountability tools such as community score cards, citizen report cards
- Facilitating grievance redress and building feedback loops for citizens to report shortcomings and discuss remedies
- Monitoring public procurement and delivery of goods and infrastructure at the local level, such as school construction and pharmaceutical delivery
- Participating in local budget formulation, decision-making and expenditure monitoring
- Forming coalitions for to amplify the voices of vulnerable communities

**Modes of expansion.** Experience suggests that it is possible to expand civic engagement efforts to the sub-national or national level, especially involving national service delivery programs operating at the local level with common approaches, standards and metrics. Institutionalizing engagement should begin through a series of demonstrative projects in

different settings following an appropriate contextual analysis. These programs would pursue “thick” engagement in selected sectors and regions designed to test and validate the proposition that civic engagement can be effective and influence the broad good governance agenda.

**Model CSO Programs for Enhancing Governance.** To illustrate the evidence presented, we have selected four examples of civil society-led good governance programs that use a well-defined approach based on a theory of change, operate at grassroots level, are led by CSOs, and cover more than one developing country:

- *World Vision’s Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) Process:* A component of larger projects that empowers beneficiaries to monitor, seek accountability and take collective responsibility for improved service delivery. This program has been implemented at the community level in countries such as Uganda, Pakistan, Armenia, Kosovo, Romania, Pakistan, and Lebanon.
- *CARE’s Community Score Card (CSC) Program:* An approach to improve the quality of services in CARE-supported programs through citizen feedback. It has been utilized in Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania.
- *Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA):* A partnership established by the World Bank to empower citizen voice and support government capacity to respond to citizen demand. It has funded projects in more than 25 countries including the Philippines, Mongolia, Guinea, Georgia, Mauritania and Indonesia.
- *Partnership for Transparency (PTF):* PTF-supported projects developed by CSOs in consultation with global development experts that facilitate citizen action to fight corruption and improve governance. PTF has supported projects and programs in more than 50 countries including the Philippines, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Latvia, Serbia, Kenya, Cameroon, Mongolia, and Ghana.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS TO EXPAND CSO CONTRIBUTIONS TO GOOD GOVERNANCE

**RECOMMENDATION 1: CSOs should accelerate, expand and intensify their programs using the entry points emerging from SDG16 national action plans and IFI stakeholder engagement policies.** These policies are opening up significant new opportunities for CSOs to constructively engage with authorities to improve the delivery of public services and participate in the design and delivery of development policies and programs.

The process of intensifying CSO involvement should seek to: (i) engage CSOs in the planning and implementation of SDG16 national action plans; (ii) influence the design of

government and IFI-funded programs to make provisions for CSO engagement; (iii) seek contracts for promoting civic engagement and corruption free public services ; and (iv) scale-up advocacy for governments to “institutionalize” CSO engagement in public services.

**RECOMMENDATION 2: CSOs should follow an evidence-based approach in designing and implementing programs for maximum effectiveness.** We recommend the following guiding principles: 1) Begin with context and political economy analysis; 2) Choose SDG/IFI related objectives, outcomes and activities where success is most likely; 3) Aim for a long-term programmatic and iterative approach; 4) Seek formalization of engagement with authorities; 5) Generate research evidence on results; and 6) Share results with governments, international NGOs (INGOs), UN Agencies and IFIs.

**RECOMMENDATION 3: Governments should encourage active civil society participation in the design and implementation of operations.** Civic engagement depends to a large extent on the government attitude and policies. We recommend that governments institutionalize active civil society contributions in-line with Agenda 2030 commitments. We endorse and highlight following recommendations of the [Rome Civil Society Declaration on SDG16+](#) for governments action: 1) Engage local and grassroots civil society to support implementation of SDGs; 2) Ensure ongoing and sustained financial support for CSOs to support SDGs implementation; and 3) Expand civil society space and create an enabling environment in which civil society can freely and safely operate and assemble.

**RECOMMENDATION 4: Governments, IFIs and other donors should adopt guidelines to fund citizen/stakeholder engagement in the projects they support.** IFIs and other donors generally require stakeholder engagement in programs they fund, but fail to explicitly allocate funds for such activities. As a result, stakeholder engagement often does not happen in a meaningful manner, particularly during implementation. IFIs should consider adopting a proposal recently put forth by the members of the [TAP Network](#) to create an “SDG16+ Challenge Fund” that would help support CSOs advance the ambitions of SDG16.

We suggest IFIs adopt guidelines that require staff to explicitly budget funds for stakeholder engagement (about 1% is the suggested norm) and give priority to grassroots CSOs for designing and implementing such engagement. This is an indicative figure representing the need for a simple, explicit budgeting practice across the board to incorporate into all development activities. To the extent possible, budgets for third party monitoring should be provided separately from the project budget and the oversight of the project authorities to avoid conflict of interest.

**RECOMMENDATION 5: INGOs and foundations should assist CSOs in leveraging opportunities opened by IFI stakeholder engagement policies.** These policies have the

potential to expand roles for CSOs in the design and implementation of stakeholder engagement components of IFI-funded projects. To take advantage of this potential, CSOs need the funding and staff to participate in project identification and preparation phases with the objective of maximizing CSO roles and business opportunities. There is enormous potential, but no incentives on part of government and IFIs teams working on project design and procurement plans. We recommend that INGOs and foundations expand their funding for CSOs to expand their up-stream (to integrate greater CSO engagement in project design) and downstream (to monitor implementation of CSO engagement) opportunities in IFI funded projects. This could be done by increasing funding to CSOs directly or through IFI established trust funds.

**RECOMMENDATION 6: IFIs should be proactive in encouraging governments to engage civil society in good governance goals.** IFIs generally, and multilateral development banks (MDBs) specifically, have commendable policies for engaging civil society. They also have the ability to influence the governments to open up space for civic engagement by funding CSO-led projects as well as through their policy dialogue and policy based lending. However, IFI performance is far short of the potential.

We recommend the following actions to ramp up CSO engagement in operations funded by IFIs: 1) Identify opportunities for CSOs to facilitate stakeholder engagement; 2) Include explicit provisions for CSOs to participate and anti-corruption plans; 3) Make changes in financing facilities and business processes for easier CSO contracting; 4) Include stakeholder engagement as part of country and sector assessments; 5) Use results-based lending to open up civic space; and 6) Establish systems to monitor and report on funding allocated and contracted to CSOs.

**RECOMMENDATION 7: Support CSO Networks and Coalitions.** CSOs are far more likely to have impact if they pool together in their quest for change. Indeed, coalitions between different groups of CSOs and at different levels (local, national, and international) were shown to be the most effective to bring about change and to help achieve sustainability. Networks need dedicated funding and staffing to enable them to work as equal partners with the public sector and private sector.



# **CHAPTER 1:** **A GLOBALLY SHARED** **AGENDA**

**Good governance and control of corruption are positively correlated with effective development results.**<sup>1</sup> This is recognized in the [Sustainable Development Goals \(SDGs\)](#) and strategic priorities of International Financial Institutions (IFIs).<sup>i</sup> The [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development \(Agenda 2030\)](#), adopted in 2015 by all 193 United Nations (UN) member nations, includes [Sustainable Development Goal 16 \(SDG16\)](#) and its corresponding targets for: substantially reducing corruption; developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions; ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making and ensuring public access to information, among others.<sup>2</sup> These commitments represent a global shift in thinking away from an exclusive focus on development outcomes to factors that are integrally related, as is governance and anti-corruption. They put us in a new era of a globally shared agenda for enhancing governance and controlling corruption.

**Despite global commitments, the good governance goals of SDG16 and the IFIs may remain largely aspirational unless actions are accelerated and expanded.** This view is supported by cross-country governance indicators and other studies that demonstrate the state of corruption has not changed substantially in the past two decades, despite progress in some countries.<sup>3</sup> Available data so far indicates that progress towards SDG16 is lagging or “uneven” at best.<sup>4</sup> Four years into implementation, we are at a critical

### BOX I: GOOD GOVERNANCE: A KEY TO PROSPERITY

*Agenda 2030 “recognizes the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective rule of law and good governance... and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions...”* – **Agenda 2030, United Nations, August 2015**

*“Without paying greater attention to stronger governance, the World Bank Group’s goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity, as well as the transformational vision of the United Nations’ broader Sustainable Development Goals, will be out of reach.”* – **President of the World Bank in introduction to the World Development Report 2017: Governance and The Law**

*“Analysis of effects of weak governance and corruption on growth shows that high corruption is associated with significantly lower growth, investment, foreign direct investment, and tax revenues. It also finds that they are associated with higher inequality and lower inclusive growth.”* – **IMF-Enhanced Framework on Governance, April 2018**

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<sup>i</sup> IFIs examined in this study include the [World Bank](#), [International Monetary Fund \(IMF\)](#), [Asian Development Bank \(ADB\)](#), [African Development Bank \(AfDB\)](#) and [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development \(EBRD\)](#).

moment in determining whether SDG16 will fulfill its potential or remain aspirational rhetoric.


**Increased civic engagement<sup>ii</sup> is important to accelerate progress towards SDG16 and improve effectiveness of IFI good governance and anti-corruption efforts.** Even when governments institute measures to improve governance, these often do not work as intended, be it because of implementation capacity constraints, weak incentives or design loopholes. These so-called “supply side” measures need to be complemented by a demand for accountability from below. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) represent, support and embolden the “demand side” of democratic governance—engendering greater citizen uptake, better feedback and independent oversight.

**In this context, the purpose of our research is to examine roles that civil society plays in improving governance outcomes under SDG16 and IFI policies, review the evidence on what works and what does not, and present recommendations to establish and expand successful programs.**

Actions at the national level and public budgets will be the primary determinant of progress in achieving SDG targets including SDG16. At the same time, IFI policies and funding play an important role in helping low and middle-income countries with their policies and programs. We believe that IFIs can play important catalytic roles in expanding CSO-led initiatives in improving governance and providing demonstration effects. We have therefore targeted them in our analysis and recommendations.

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<sup>ii</sup> The World Bank defines civic engagement as “the participation of private actors in the public sphere, conducted through direct and indirect interactions of civil society organizations and citizens-at-large with government, multilateral institutions and business establishments to influence decision making or pursue common goals.” The term is synonymous with both civil society engagement and citizen engagement.



**CHAPTER 2:**  
**SDG16**  
**PROGRESS**

In 2015, the [Millennium Development Goals \(MDGs\)](#) were updated and replaced with the [Sustainable Development Goals \(SDGs\)](#), a product of several years of intensive consultative processes promoted by the UN and organized by both public and non-state actors. The final formulation of the [17 Goals and 169 Targets](#) was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2015, and the Goals entered into force at the beginning of 2016. The 17 SDGs look beyond economic and social variables to the conditions necessary for sustainable development.<sup>5</sup>

**SDG16, Governance and Linkages to other SDGs.** Goal 16 covers peace, governance and justice, with 12 targets and 23 indicators (*see Annex II: SDG16 Targets & Indicators*) of which 4 targets and 8 indicators are referred in this paper as the 'governance agenda' of SDG16 (*see Box II: Key Governance Related Targets & Indicators of SDG16*). Inclusion of these targets and indicators in Agenda 2030 constitutes the international community's acknowledgement that good governance, inclusion, and justice are fundamental to development, necessary for the achievement of Agenda 2030, and essential for inclusive growth and prosperity. It is both an end in itself and key to ensuring that other SDGs can be accomplished.

**IFI Governance Agendas and SDG16.** IFIs like the World Bank, Regional Development Banks (RDBs)<sup>6</sup> and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have

## BOX II: KEY GOVERNANCE RELATED TARGETS & INDICATORS OF SDG16

### Target 16.5: Reduce corruption and bribery

**Indicator 16.5.1:** Persons who paid or were asked for a bribe by a public official

**Indicator 16.5.2:** Businesses that paid or were asked for a bribe by a public official

### Target 16.6: Effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

**Indicator 16.6.1:** Government expenditures as a proportion of approved budget

**Indicator 16.6.2:** Percentage of population satisfied with public services

### Target 16.7: Responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

**Indicator 16.7.1:** Positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups) in public institutions

**Indicator 16.7.2:** Inclusive and responsive decision-making

### Target 16.10: Public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms

**Indicator 16.10.1:** Violence against media, trade unionists and human rights advocates

**Indicator 16.10.2:** Public access to information

*Source: Abbreviated from the UN's Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform. Accessed at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16>*

### BOX III: GOVERNANCE AND THE SDGS

The success of the SDGs depends to a large extent on good public governance of implementation efforts. Illustrative examples to demonstrate the interaction between governance and some SDGs are given below.

**SDG1—No poverty.** People living in poverty are disproportionately exposed to various risk factors that are exacerbated by shortcomings in public service delivery. Inversely, quality public services can be the linchpin that lifts individuals and communities out of poverty.

**SDG3—Health.** Health care is a decentralized service by necessity which presents many opportunities for corruption along the supply chain. Leakage of drugs and medical supplies impedes on the ability of doctors and nurses to provide quality services.

**SDG4—Quality Education.** Parent-teacher associations and other community groups can serve as a check on school administration and teacher conduct, ensuring standards are met and budgets are spent judiciously.

**SDG5—Gender Equality.** Due to common gendered roles and responsibilities, women are disproportionately reliant on public services such as medical care, clean water and food rations, and so are disproportionately impacted by a disruption in those services due to inefficiencies, corruption and mismanagement.

**SDG6—Clean Water and Sanitation.** A failure to enforce laws can leave water sources vulnerable to pollution and encroachment. Lack of community consultation in the placement of water infrastructure, like irrigation systems, can result in major inefficiencies.

**SDG7—Affordable and clean energy.** Programs that introduce renewable energy sources to poor communities can utilize citizen engagement to ensure these resources go to the families and institutions for which they are intended, and not sold on the black market or collecting dust.

**SDG8 -- Decent work and economic growth.** Civic engagement can help make sure economic growth is inclusive. Inequities and disparities widen where poor governance and weak rule-of-law is exploited for economic gain (e.g. failure to pay workers; poor working conditions).

**SDG11—Cities and Communities.** Urbanization and social media provide opportunities for improving governance but are also seen as governance risks, especially to more repressive regimes. Constructive engagement between civil society and government can be a positive, non-confrontational method to address dissatisfaction and unrest within the citizenry.

recently adopted or updated policies and programs for enhancing governance and controlling corruption (see *Annex III: IMF and Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) Policies on Good Governance*). The corporate strategies of IFIs include commitments and performance indicators for helping their member countries improve governance, specifically to:

- promote effective, timely, accountable, inclusive and corruption-free delivery of public services;
- conduct transparent and effective public financial management;
- employ anti-corruption measures in all projects and programs they fund;
- fulfill rights to information;
- help implement national action plans for open government and the SDGs; and
- engage with stakeholders, including CSOs, in all of their operations.

**IFI commitments<sup>iii</sup> embody the following aspirations in common with SDG16 and constitute a globally shared agenda for good governance:**

- Reducing corruption and bribery
- Developing transparent and accountable institutions
- Responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making
- Enhancing public access to information
- Increasing responsiveness of service delivery
- Increasing effectiveness of public financial management and procurement
- Proactive civic engagement and feedback loops
- Reducing illicit financial flows

These commitments have been followed by the adoption of: (a) 'Governance and Institutions' as a special theme under the [Eighteenth Replenishment of the International Development Association \(IDA18\)](#) with specific performance indicators<sup>7</sup>; and (b) IMF adoption of an *Enhanced Framework on Governance* in 2018 to assess the nature and severity of governance and corruption vulnerabilities (particularly to foreign bribery and money laundering) in its member countries and provide recommendations to address them.<sup>8</sup> A 2013 review of IFI spending by the [Overseas Development Institute \(ODI\)](#) demonstrates that these commitments are reflected in lending, as "peace, justice and

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<sup>iii</sup> We reviewed policies of the IMF, World Bank, ADB and AfDB. This list is based on that and findings are summarized in Annex III. More generally all IFIs have declared that they support SDGs.

strong institutions' account for the largest share of IFI-disbursed [Official Development Assistance] to the SDGs with 18% of all disbursements.”<sup>9</sup>

### Initial reports of SDG16 progress indicate implementation is falling short.

At the global level, the UN notes, “Advances in promoting the rule of law and access to justice are uneven.

However, progress is being made in regulations to promote public access to information, albeit slowly, and in strengthening institutions upholding human rights at the national level.”<sup>10</sup>

The UN Secretary-General’s 2018 SDG Report notes that “almost one in five firms worldwide report receiving at least one bribery payment request when engaged in regulatory or utility transactions.”<sup>11</sup> On the positive side:

“Freedom-of-information laws and policies have been adopted by 116 countries, with at least 25 countries doing so over the last five years. However, implementation remains a challenge.”<sup>12</sup>

## BOX IV: SDG16 MONITORING FRAMEWORK

The framework for monitoring SDG16 targets comprises of:

- a) Progress Indicators for each Target.
- b) Annual Report by the UN Secretary General covering all SDGs.
- c) Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) presented at an annual UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF)
- d) Independent CSO monitoring and initiatives ,e.g. SDG16 Data Initiative; SDG16 Progress Report; and Global Policy Watch Report.

*See Annex IV: Monitoring the Governance-Related Targets in SDG16 for more details on these initiatives.*

Countries have thus far tended to give little critical information in their Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) on governance as foreseen by the SDG16 indicators. The 2018 VNR Synthesis report prepared by the UN Secretariat notes:

*“Several countries (among them Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Ecuador, Mali, Guinea, and Sri Lanka) elaborated on measures to promote good governance, protection of human rights, and the eradication of violence – especially against women and children...Several countries reported on their efforts to combat organized crime, money laundering and terrorist financing, corruption and bribery. Ecuador, for example, is seeking through education and training to generate a society with ethical and civic values to promote rejection of corruption...Slovakia and Hungary reported on their projects supporting countries to strengthen national institutions and public-sector effectiveness.”<sup>13</sup>*

The widespread under-reporting or failure to report on sensitive issues in the VNR process, including many SDG16 indicators, poses an obstacle to reliable data collection. This applies particularly to reporting internationally on corruption, where public

authorities may face a conflict of interest. The [Institute for Economics and Peace](#), in its [2019 SDG16 Progress Report](#), notes “Just four of the 44 indicators have data available for all 163 countries... [and] only two indicators have a trend series of five or more years.”<sup>14</sup> Broader challenges include limited resources, capacity, and in some cases, political will to support data production, collection, and monitoring.<sup>15</sup>

It is anticipated that more data and analysis on the progress towards SDG16 will result from the UN’s HLPF in 2019 where it is slated for an in-depth review:

*“The conference will take stock of global progress towards achieving the SDG16; share knowledge, success stories and good practices; identify particular areas of concern and main challenges; and suggest ways forward in terms of policies, partnerships and coordinated actions at all levels as well as specific ways to leverage the interlinkages between SDG16 and the other Goals.”<sup>16</sup>*

**Unofficial reporting has been undertaken by CSOs in parallel to UN reporting.** The lack of official data has influenced the adoption of unofficial sources to supplement what is formally available in order to piece together a clearer picture of SDG16 progress. The SDG16 Data Initiative (SDG16DI), for instance, is a CSO-led effort “intended to complement efforts currently underway to develop an official indicator framework for monitoring the SDGs... [including] both globally agreed SDG16 indicators and additional, complementary indicators, which data experts regard as contributing to a more multi-faceted and comprehensive measure of progress against the various targets.”<sup>17</sup> Parallel indicators identified by the SDG16DI averaged 87% availability versus the 44% availability for the official indicators of the UN Statistical Commission’s Inter-Agency Expert Group (IAEG).<sup>18</sup>

The [2017 SDG16DI Report](#) notes the following:”

- According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the global average of firms being asked for a bribe is 17.8 per cent, ranging from 1.9 per cent average in high-income OECD countries to 30.4 per cent in the east Asia and Pacific region
- Over two-thirds of the 176 countries and territories in the 2016 CPI fell below [50 points] on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
- The Global Corruption Barometer estimates that more than one billion people have paid bribes across 53 countries in Asia Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in order to access public services in the last 12 months.
- Civil society’s freedom from governmental repression has been impeded in all regions, in particular in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, MENA, and Asia Pacific according to Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), a research collaborative focused on collecting global data-sets for complex indicators of democracy.

- Freedom House, in its annual Freedom in the World report, stated: “A total of 67 countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties in 2016, compared with 36 that registered gains. This marked the 11th consecutive year in which declines outnumbered improvements.”<sup>19</sup>

**Under Agenda 2030, countries have agreed that partnerships between governments, CSOs, private sector and international organizations are essential for achieving the SDGs.** The World Bank, Regional Development Banks (RDBs) and IMF have CSO collaboration policies in place and several of them are updating their policies (see *ANNEX IV: Comparison of IFI Policies, Procedures and Institutional Arrangements for Civil Society Engagement*). However, IFIs do not monitor and report on the number of CSOs they fund, the amount of funding awarded for CSO contracts or capacity building, or results of CSO work.

**SDG17 Calls for multi-stakeholder partnerships.** Unlike the MDGs, where governments had an overwhelmingly dominant role, Agenda 2030 adopts an “all of society” approach for achievement of the SDGs. It recognizes that without the active engagement of the private sector and civil society, the financing, implementation activities and initiatives, and monitoring necessary for achievement of the SDGs will be impossible. Specifically, **SDG17** sets the following targets for multi-stakeholder partnerships:

**Target 17.16** – Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries; and,

**Target 17.17** – Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships.

**CSOs are expected to play several roles in implementation and monitoring of SDGs including governance targets under SDG16.**

CSOs from around the world played an important role in shaping the global governance agenda at the IFIs through advocacy and through constructive engagement in consultations. These roles and how to carry them out are well articulated in the **TAP Network Goal 16 Advocacy Toolkit**.<sup>20</sup> This Toolkit “provides civil society and other nongovernmental stakeholders with guidance on how to engage with their governments and other local, regional or international stakeholders to support the planning, implementation, follow-up and accountability of Goal 16.”<sup>21</sup>

How-to guidance is provided for CSOs in the following four areas:

- 1) Supporting national planning
- 2) Supporting national implementation
- 3) Supporting national follow up and monitoring
- 4) Engaging at the global level through participation in multinational processes

**Although there are no official indicators by which to measure the level of CSO involvement in the SDGs evidence suggests that civil society has generally not had the opportunity, means or access to fulfill their role under SDG16.**

The [UN Economic and Social Council \(ECOSOC\)](#) has stressed the importance of early and informed collaboration and cooperation at the national level by governments for multi-stakeholder dialogues. With a few exceptions, a common complaint among many of the CSOs attending the 2018 HLPF has been that few governments have done this to date. The [TAP Network](#) produced a synthesis report on *TAP Network Survey on Strategic Priorities and Advocacy for the 2019 HLPFs*, noting:

*“Many [CSO members] highlighted that engagement mechanisms with civil society were not as inclusive as they had hoped, with official entry points lacking. Many respondents noted that the HLPF did not have any mechanisms to take up any civil society reports, and highlighted that the lack of mechanisms for this engagement and follow up and review were challenges to holding governments accountable. Some also noted that the process for the VNRs was not efficient (particularly in regards to the time and space allocated for VNR presentations), and lacked entry points for civil society, and limited opportunities for interaction and dialogue.”<sup>22</sup>*

Other common themes from CSO respondents were the need for greater capacity building, networking and funding to better participate in the SDG agenda at national and global levels.<sup>23</sup>

**Several recent initiatives for rethinking governance and anti-corruption approaches are underway that emphasize CSO engagement.** Examples include the [World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law; Anti-corruption Policies Revisited](#), a five-year research project of the European Union; the ongoing [British Academy/DFID Anti-Corruption Evidence Partnership](#); and the [Pathfinders for SDG16+](#) and [SDG16+ Forum](#).<sup>24</sup> All of these initiatives underscore the difficulties inherent in improving governance and recognize that civil society has to be part of the solution through its advocacy, monitoring and own-managed programs.



# **CHAPTER 3:**

**RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF  
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT  
TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE**

The international community has called for civic engagement as a means to improve governance and achieve the SDGs. CSOs are contributing in at least three ways:

- 1) Influencing government and IFI policies** and programs through advocacy and participation.
- 2) Helping citizens and communities apply social accountability approaches** to government and IFI programs with the objectives of reducing corruption, enhancing inclusion and access, enabling participatory decision-making and promoting increased transparency and accountability.
- 3) Monitoring commitments made by governments and IFIs**, tracking their progress and holding them accountable by participating in multi-stakeholder review processes established by the SDGs and IFIs.

If civic engagement is to be appropriately scaled to achieve its intended impact it must be strategic and evidence based. Chapter 3 aims to contribute to this effort by discussing what research and evidence shows as to whether and under what circumstances it works. The evidence we have presented below is primarily related to the effectiveness of approaches in contributing to SDG16 targets such as 16.5 (reducing bribery), 16.6 (transparent and accountable institutions), 16.7 (participatory decision making) and 16.10 (access to information) and more generally to other SDG targets which can only be met with sound governance

There are few comprehensive and methodologically rigorous studies of whether desired impacts have been achieved from civic engagement, and if so, how. This stems in part from a failure to systematically specify desired outcomes at the outset. As a result, we have also reviewed more than 40 studies that look at evidence from hundreds of cases and sources to distill common conclusions (*see ANNEX I: References of the Literature Review*).

A thorough review of the evidence leads us to conclude that civic engagement can be an important positive complement to top-down, so-called “supply-side” measures, provided they are designed and implemented appropriately taking local context into account. Indeed, experience suggests that without civic engagement, governance may suffer and reform measures may fail. Progress in addressing governance challenges often, if not always, requires demand from citizens to provide a critical incentive for duty bearers to perform responsibly.

## BOX V: KEY INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

- 1) Context Matters. The exact same measure that works in one context may not work, without adaptation, in another.
- 2) In suitable contexts, positive outcomes are produced, such as increased: transparency; access; community participation and empowerment; government responsiveness; implementation effectiveness; grievance redress; inclusion; accountability of the state; budget utilization; trust in public institutions; and reduced waste and corruption.
- 3) The strongest evidence of positive outcomes is found in public services delivery and public financial management.
- 4) Use of CSOs as intermediaries makes a significant difference in raising awareness, organizing collective action, facilitating constructive engagement with authorities, ensuring inclusion, and closing feedback loops.
- 5) Combining multiple social accountability tools and continuous engagement to enable collective action produces better outcomes than one intervention for a short period.
- 6) Closing the feedback loop is essential for positive outcomes to materialize.
- 7) In certain contexts, negative outcomes (token participation, reprisals and/or denial of service, elite capture, violent state response, community disenchantment) can occur.
- 8) Success at local levels has seldom led to change and institutionalization at sub-national and national program levels.

**Source:** *These insights are compiled by PTF based on literature review involving more than 40 studies and meta-studies containing synthesis of hundreds of other primary sources.*

According to McGee and Gaventa in *Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Social Accountability Initiatives* (2010), the evidence suggests that "...[transparency and accountability] initiatives can contribute to a range of positive outcomes including, for instance:

- increased state or institutional responsiveness
- lowering of corruption
- building new democratic spaces for citizen engagement
- empowering local voices
- better budget utilization and better delivery of services."<sup>25</sup>

Much, however, depends on context and design. In this chapter, we will explore what experience tells us about the impact of social accountability measures and the conditions under which these impacts may be achieved.

*Do They Work? Assessing The Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives in Service Delivery* (Joshi 2013) reviews the experience of social accountability programs in a wide number of countries having both relatively strong and weak governance contexts. The report notes a mixed experience. On the contrary, Aslam and Schjodt (2018) found many cases where social accountability interventions, including information dissemination, score cards, and community monitoring, have led to positive outcomes in health, education and other sectors.<sup>26</sup> The review notes the substantial success of: (1) awareness raising programs; and (2) programs aiming to identify discrepancies between official accounts and actual experience.

DFID, in its 2016 review of 50 social accountability projects across a range of contexts found they "almost always lead to better services, with services becoming more accessible and staff attendance improving."<sup>27</sup> Likewise, PTF has worked with over 250 CSO projects across more than 50 countries during the past two decades.<sup>28</sup> Evaluations of PTF experience show that over 85% of the projects it supported have been successful and had sometimes significant impact relative to the resources expended.<sup>29</sup> Some of these projects are discussed further in Chapter 4.

### **Civic Engagement documented in Studies at the Sectoral Level.**

Studies in the **education** sector note the evidence base in many cases does not permit unambiguous conclusions. Evidence to date presents mixed results about the potential of information for accountability to improve learning outcomes. At the same time, on balance, school-based management (SBM), which often entails greater parental knowledge and involvement, has been shown to be a useful reform for a number of reasons, particularly when integrated with other interventions.<sup>30</sup> Looking at

accountability at the school level, Read and Atinc (2017) find that “(w)hile a select number of initiatives have reduced corruption; improved managerial, parental and teacher effort; and led to more efficient targeting of reforms and resources at the school level... certain enabling conditions are required to facilitate the meaningful engagement of citizens.”<sup>31</sup>

*Engaging Citizens in Health Service Delivery* (Edstrom 2015) reviews the literature on social accountability in **health** service delivery. The review finds that there are no unambiguous blueprints or consistent findings, and that much depends on context, design and implementation. “Research evidence confirms the potentially positive, although variable, impact of citizen engagement on health outcomes, but generally only when they complement a broader package of services.”<sup>32</sup> The review further notes that successful interventions all involved raising community awareness of targeted health issues and encouraging dialogue and community ownership. Building and sustaining trust within the community was often cited as an important contributor to successful outcomes.

Björkman and Svensson’s (2009) randomized experiment with community participation in monitoring of public primary health providers in 50 facilities in Uganda revealed important health and accountability results. The study documented a 33 percent reduction in child under-five mortality, as well as several other positive impacts on service utilization and health outcomes.

Civic engagement has also shown positive results in **conditional cash transfer programs (CCTPs)**, often employed as part of a country’s social safety net. In *Citizen Engagement and Social Accountability Approaches in Enhancing Integrity of Conditional Cash Transfer*

## BOX VI: SUCCESSFUL CSO ENGAGEMENT IN STRENGTHENING EDUCATION GOVERNANCE

SAVE-Ghana targeted corruption in education in the form of chronic teacher absenteeism, “ghost teachers” on the payroll who never actually teach, and illegal school fees. The project organized and engaged local authorities, parent-teacher associations, and school management committees to better manage schools and provide oversight.

The project assisted the government in eliminating 7 “ghost” teachers, and that will save the government about Ghc 84,000 per annum, or about 44,000 U.S. dollars. Other results include the identification of about Ghc 1,200 (US \$636.00) in missing funds which has since been refunded by school authorities. With respect to teacher absenteeism, SAVE-Ghana projects that for the targeted schools, it has or will be reduced from 57% to about 25%.

*Source: Sustainable Aid Through Voluntary Establishment-Ghana (2013) Project Completion Summary for SAVE-Ghana. Available at: [ptfund.org/projects-database/](http://ptfund.org/projects-database/)*

*Programs* (2015) Vinay Bhargava and Shomikho Raha review studies of CCTPs in several countries in Latin America, five countries in Africa and the Middle East, and in the Philippines. The review finds that CCTPs continue to face issues of access, fraud and corruption and that civic engagement can help to mitigate these problems, with the usual caveats regarding context and design.

Several reviews of CSO experience have indicated positive impact of social accountability in ***budgeting and its implementation***. In *Why Corruption Matters* (2015), DFID notes that there is a medium-sized body of consistent evidence indicating ***public expenditure tracking (PETS)*** is successful in identifying corruption risks and leaks. It also notes that monitoring public finances has preventive effects. Tracking is likely to achieve stronger results in reducing corruption in combination with other policy reforms and citizen engagement. Other studies have also shown some positive effects of PETS in both Malawi (International Budget Partnership 2008) and Tanzania (Gauthier 2006).

Hasan (2018) found that transparency and monitoring of public finances and procurement, when used in combination with other reforms, such as strengthening supreme audit institutions, have the strongest potential impact on reducing corruption, even in fragile states.

Mungiu-Pippidi (2017), in studying experience with anti-corruption measures in Europe, found that budget transparency, as measured by the ***Open Budget Index***, was significantly

### BOX VII: SUCCESSFUL CSO ENGAGEMENT IN STRENGTHENING HEALTH GOVERNANCE

PTF partnered with Samuhik Abhiyan in Nepal to work with citizens, government, political leaders, the private sector and the media to strengthen awareness, create corruption monitoring committees (CMCs) and implement a number of instruments like citizen charters and score cards to monitor health service delivery.

The project registered a 35% increase in health service attendance as a result of its work, and poor patients began receiving 85% of their free medicines. Ten corruption cases were identified by the CMCs, including malpractice in procurement and allocation of travel allowances, of which 6 have been settled—a remarkable achievement in the generally corrupt and slow moving judicial systems that characterize many developing countries.

*Source: Samuhik Abhiyan (2011) Combating Corruption through Citizen Participation Project Completion Report. Available at: <https://www.ptfund.org/projects-database/>*

correlated with better control of corruption, when accompanied by public scrutiny, media and e-citizenship.

Petrie (2017) notes that de Renzio and Wehner find in a systematic review of rigorous literature that there is strong evidence, mainly at the subnational level, linking participatory budgeting mechanisms to shifts in resource allocations and to improvements in public service delivery.

Given the weight of public sector procurement in government expenditures, and the amount of leakage that occurs globally, CSO monitoring of procurement can have a big pay-off. PTF has supported CSOs in five countries to help implement integrity pacts (India, Latvia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Peru) involving CSO procurement monitoring. Showing the potential for impact, in Pakistan, PTF provided a grant to the Association of Retired Public Engineers of Karachi to help the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board to implement an integrity pact for a huge water and sewerage project. This intervention resulted in project savings of \$17 million.<sup>33</sup>

### Experience with different social accountability instruments.

**Community scorecards and citizen report cards** are two mechanisms to obtain feedback from service and project beneficiaries, with the former involving discussion with the

## BOX VIII: EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL CSO ENGAGEMENT IN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, PROCUREMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNANCE

In Latvia, budget monitoring by **Transparency International (DELNA)** led to construction costs of the National Library being reduced by some €5.5 million, and the activation of a deflation clause saving a further €3.5 million.

In Azerbaijan, monitoring by the Center for **Economic and Social Development (CESD)** revealed that \$17 million went missing in the construction of the Azerbaijan Oil Fund. Some of these resources have been returned and the Fund has negotiated with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to develop a code of ethics. CESD also exposed a \$10.4 million discrepancy in a railway construction project.

In Nigeria collaboration with the **Development Alternatives and Resource Center (DARC)** led to the training of procurement officers and the clean-up of procurement practice with an estimated savings of \$2.7 million in the Cross River State over nine months.

*Sources: DELNA (2006) Final Report on the Project Implementation of Integrity Pacts in Three Large Scale Construction Projects in Latvia.*

*CESD (2008) Final Report on "Monitoring of Expenditures of State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan Republic" Project.*

*DARC (2011) Project Completion Report.*

*All project documents available at <https://www.ptfund.org/projects-database/>*

community. Edstrom's literature review indicates these instruments have been documented to have improved health services in a number of cases, e.g. in Kenya, Uganda, although they did not produce positive results in others, perhaps because they were not designed to take account of local conditions. Citizen report cards, which were pioneered in India by the [Public Affairs Centre](#) in Bangalore, have had positive impact on the delivery of public services.<sup>34</sup> Björkman and Svensson's (2009) randomized experiment in Ugandan health facilities mentioned above made use of citizen report cards as a monitoring tool.

**Third-party monitoring** has been shown to have positive impact in the right contexts and design, for example in the case of the Integrity Pacts as discussed above. The media can be a powerful third-party force for accountability, if it is perceived to be independent and objective. Local media played a critical role in disseminating information about government audits in Brazil and inducing a decline in corruption among both audited and unaudited nearby municipalities.<sup>35</sup> Investigative journalism in the United States has been a strong force for accountability since Watergate.

**Importance of coalitions.** CSOs are far more likely to have impact if they pool together in their quest for change. Indeed, coalitions between different groups and at different levels (local, national, and international) were shown to be the most effective to bring about change and to help achieve sustainability.

DFID's health sector support in Nigeria, which invested in network-building indicated that building partnerships between Family Health Centers (FHCs) and CSOs provided the FHCs with the necessary clout to influence decision-making. The program also supported citizen groups to take part in state health sector strategy deliberations, "...with impressive outcomes..."<sup>36</sup>

**Interaction**, a large umbrella organization of civil society organizations in the US concerned with international development, has observed the importance of collaboration among NGOs: "If the US NGO community disregards the message of uniting towards a shared vision of a better world, as represented by the SDGs, we may decrease our opportunities to partner with others for greater impact on eliminating extreme poverty, promoting greater justice, and protecting the environment."<sup>37</sup>

**Policy and Implementation Challenges.** Some of the most widely recognizable challenges to civic engagement include:

- **Difficulty with institutionalization.** DFID (2016) notes that "While social accountability initiatives at the local-level tend to be effective, their achievements are usually limited and difficult to sustain."<sup>38</sup> Experience suggests that it is possible to expand citizen engagement efforts to the sub-national or national level,

especially involving widespread programs operating at the local level with common approaches, standards and metrics.

- **Lack of long-term commitments.** Social accountability is a long-term iterative process (Ayliffe, Aslam and Schjodt, 2017; Grandvionnet, 2015), with incremental progress and setbacks en route. It is important to persist beyond the short-term. However, long-term sustained financing for developing country CSOs is extremely rare. Unlike governments and the private sector, CSOs do not have tax revenues or business income to support their work. They need the support of others, typically from philanthropic institutions and income from projects where they provide services. As such, funding sustainability can vary widely depending on financial swings and donor interest. This reality often forces gaps in programming and stalls progress on innovative programs.
- **CSO capacity limitations.** CSOs need to expand their skill-set and grassroots presence to design and implement effective programs to improve governance. CSOs generally suffer from inadequate resources, capacity and knowledge on government policy processes, all contributing to sustainability challenges. Continuity in personnel is also a challenge.<sup>39</sup> To have a broader and sustained impact, CSOs must overcome these challenges, and try to institutionalize activities and processes at a higher-level.
- **Weak monitoring and evaluation.** Many studies on civic engagement are less rigorous than ideal. In part, this stems from inadequate defining of outcomes to be achieved. Absent a clear definition of planned outcomes, success may mean different things to different people. For example, while one person may be seeking greater equity in outcomes across the target population, another may be seeking enough coverage of the population to prevent an epidemic. It is important to set realistic expectations, evaluate, make changes as needed.

**Importance of context.** Evidence indicates that civic engagement has the potential for important positive impact. Whether that potential is realized or not depends in large part on context. We know in a general sense what measures have the potential to bring good results but it is unlikely that the exact same measure that works in one context will work, without adaption, in another. In Uganda, community scorecards for health services helped produce significant improvements in health service delivery, and in Kenya community scorecards produced enhanced results in 10 out of 13 indicators.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, community monitoring of health providers in Sierra Leone had limited results in light of accountability gaps up the chain of command.<sup>41</sup>

Important determinant aspects of context for the effectiveness of social accountability interventions are: (a) political economy and (b) political leadership.

- a) **Political Economy.** Societies are composed of a complicated web of players with different interests, power and incentives. Understanding and accounting for these differences is fundamental. In a society where women are marginalized, it would be naïve to expect feedback mechanisms to be inclusive absent special measures to ensure they feel safe and empowered to speak. Similarly, low-income citizens are unlikely to participate in social accountability activities without accommodations to ensure they do not lose resources. Thus, there should be a detailed analysis of the political economy precedent to introducing civic engagement, which should be reflected in the design.
- b) **Political Leadership.** Also important is the attitude of high political leadership towards the role of citizens in fostering accountability. The more open the leadership, the more likely that civic engagement will lead to needed change. Ringold et al's (2012) conclude that when higher-level political leadership allows for citizen participation in holding service providers accountable there is generally positive impact on outcomes. Indeed, civic engagement works best if it builds on existing accountability practices.

**Engagement between civil society and government can work in different socio-political environments if the program is adjusted to suit the context.** When the social contract between citizens and government is strong, civic engagement and social accountability can work particularly well. However, it can also work where it is weak. For example, in Rwanda, CSOs supported dialogue between citizens and local government officials yielded improvements in service delivery, notwithstanding a poor environment for civic engagement.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, evidence suggests civic engagement helps build a more open, trusting, engaging and participatory political environment over time.<sup>43</sup>

*Civil Society & Development: Global Trends, Implications and Recommendations for Stakeholders in the 2030 Agenda* identifies a cross section between the World Bank's Association, Resources, Voice Information, and Negotiation (ARVIN) framework<sup>44</sup> and the International Association for Public Participation's "Spectrum of Public Participation"<sup>45</sup> to identify CSO opportunities for engagement in different contexts (see *Table I: Contextual Framework for CSO Engagement Opportunities*).

**Research indicates that successful civic engagement programs appropriately evaluate and address the following aspects in approach design.**

**Access to and appropriate use of information.** Qualitative and quantitative information is fundamental for civil society to judge whether services are being delivered satisfactorily and projects are being implemented in line with sanctioned plans.

**TABLE I: CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CSO ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES**

		WORLD BANK ARVIN FRAMEWORK					
		Association ability of civic groups to meaningfully exist with meaning	Resources ability of civic groups to obtain resources to operate effectively	Voice ability of civic groups to express their viewpoint and be heard	Information ability of civic groups to access and process information	Negotiation ability of civic groups to impact government decision making	
IAP2 SPECTRUM OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	Inform government release of balanced and objective information	RESTRICTED	Advocate for establishment or enactment of Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation				
		ENABLED	Form CSOs with the mandate of monitoring and information released	Build the capacity of citizens and CSOs to understand and process information	Develop mechanisms to aggregate and amplify citizen voice	Implement public awareness campaigns that empower citizens to demand accountability	Use information as evidence to advocate for decisions that respond to citizen needs
	Consult government seeks public feedback	RESTRICTED	Work within government frameworks and official opportunities for engagement; clearly identify the benefits of said engagement as a basis to advocate for opening new spaces				
		ENABLED	Build coalitions to put forth common platforms	Develop tools to help citizens better understand their rights and government commitments	Support diverse viewpoints through evidence based advocacy	Compliment government solicited feedback through parallel CSO-led information gathering exercises	Work with government to ensure that feedback collected aligns with citizen concerns and priorities
	Involve government works with directly citizens to ensure feedback is consistently understood and appropriately considered	RESTRICTED	Advocate for actions that will open-up civic spaces for meaningful engagement; build the capacity of citizens and CSOs to engage with government				
		ENABLED	Identify and advocate for opportunities to institutionalize civic engagement	Develop tools to help citizens better understand their rights and obligations	Support participation by marginalized and vulnerable communities	Provide parallel opportunities for citizens to give feedback to an independent source	Collect independent feedback and compare results with government mechanisms
	Collaborate government meaningfully takes public view into decision making from planning through evaluation	RESTRICTED	Build citizen and CSO capacity to participate				
		ENABLED	Participate in global knowledge sharing events	Incentivize citizen participation, e.g. sponsor community theater events	Participate in high-level national and international decision making engagements	Monitor government programs and analyze results	Develop position papers and other knowledge materials
	Empower government allows decision making to be in the hands of citizens	RESTRICTED	Build citizen and CSO capacity to participate				
		ENABLED	Assist with the institutionalization of community structures for engagement	Share expertise with government	Support or monitor programs to ensure the inclusion of marginalized groups	Monitor government programs and analyze results	Participate as formal partners

However releasing information is not enough. It is only useful when packaged in a form that permits the audience to comprehend what is being transmitted. Releasing a large volume of information giving equal billing to the important and the trivial makes it extremely difficult for recipients to absorb what is relevant. How the information is disseminated is also key – if the information is released broadly through social media or in print, it will not be received by a person whose only means of communication is a simple mobile phone and the radio. Defining the target audience, tailoring information and determining the way it is delivered to the respective audience is critical. There also needs to be trust. If civil society does not trust in the veracity of the data government releases or in government’s willingness to take action to fix problems, it will not bother to review the information, much less use it.

Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) are important underlying tools enabling society to obtain information and pursue accountability. The effectiveness of FOIAs depend on the scale and intensity of grassroots mobilization, skills and resources of CSOs, accessibility of information, and the power of public officials to pose resistance.<sup>46</sup>

***Citizen knowledge & awareness.*** Multiple studies note the importance of citizen awareness. DFID (2017) reviewed the lessons of 50 social accountability projects it has supported. A first lesson from this review is that social accountability is more likely to succeed when citizens know their rights, be they the services to which they are entitled, procedures they can expect government agencies to follow or the specifications for new infrastructure.

***Importance of Intermediaries.*** DFID found that “social accountability initiatives are most effective when citizens are helped to understand the services to which they are entitled. The macro evaluation found compelling evidence that supporting local social accountability processes almost always resulted in improved service delivery. In 46 out of the 50 sampled cases, project support to strengthen citizen engagement with service providers contributed to service delivery improvements.”<sup>47</sup>

As Read and Atinc note, the use of intermediaries can be determinative. When citizens have difficulty understanding their rights, data released by the authorities or options for seeking redress, an intermediary can help them overcome these obstacles. Intermediaries can also motivate community elites to include marginalized groups in feedback systems and follow-up action; and can serve as a link between citizens and the authorities in seeking change. They also may be pivotal in linking like-minded community groups or CSOs to collectively seek action, thus enhancing their clout.

***Engagement with the State.*** To be effective, civic engagement requires that CSOs engage constructively with the State and that the State, or empowered actors within the State, respond and correct the deficiencies identified in service and project implementation. Indeed, “...since the 1990s, the opportunity for “state-society synergy” has not only been

recognized, but found to be essential to good policy making, governance reform and development outcomes".<sup>48</sup> Ayliffe, Aslam and Schjodt (2018) note that interventions which help to build an enabling environment and strengthen state responsiveness are more successful than those only promoting citizen voice. CSOs that engage in intensive cooperation with the state and across multiple policy levels were most successful (Larsen 2016 in OECD 2016).

**In summary, civic engagement can produce positive outcomes when designed to take appropriate account of local circumstances and when flexibly adapted to evolving experience and context.** Civic engagement and social accountability are fundamental for achieving SDG16 goals and, more broadly, many of the other SDG objectives. The goal of effective, accountable and transparent institutions at its core refers to institutions that can deliver the right services to the right beneficiaries in the right quantities and at the right price. We have seen that community monitoring of health services can result in improved health outcomes and that monitoring of textbook delivery can result in more textbooks reaching their intended destination. Benefits are also observed when communities monitor the construction of roads, the use of and payment for water and the distribution of benefits under social protection schemes. In short, citizen engagement and accountability measures can result in better outputs and outcomes.

**Entry points for new programs.** The analysis of selected international programs and the findings of multiple research programs suggest CSO interaction with government counterparts is most productive in monitoring and reporting on the delivery of public services to citizens such as health (SDG 3), education (SDG 4), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), and sustainable cities (SDG 11).

**Proven tools and methods.** Interventions that effectively facilitate civic engagement to improve public service delivery include the following:

- Raising citizen awareness of rights and responsibilities in civic affairs
- Building the capacity of citizens, CSOs and government agencies to work constructively together
- Training citizens to use tools of third party monitoring such as community score cards and citizen report cards
- Facilitating grievance redress and building feedback loops for citizens to report shortcomings and discuss remedies
- Monitoring public procurement and delivery of goods, services and infrastructure at the local level such as school and health facility construction, textbooks, pharmaceuticals, social protection supplies
- Participating in local budget formulation, decision-making and expenditure monitoring.

**Modes of expansion.** Most civic engagement is still carried out on a project-by-project basis, often funded by external donors and private philanthropy. However, experience suggests that it is possible to expand civic engagement efforts to the sub-national or national level, especially involving national programs operating at the local level with common approaches, standards and metrics. For example, PTF supported local CSOs in four states in India to monitor the performance of national poverty programs for food security and guaranteed employment for low income families, resulting in the issuance of ration cards and work permits for 75,000 families. It influenced a wholesale re-design of the programs.<sup>49</sup>

Beginning the process of institutionalizing civic engagement in national and sub-national level service delivery programs should build on many community based projects implemented or on-going in different settings and following appropriate contextual analysis for scaling-up. These programs would pursue “thick” engagement in selected sectors and regions designed to test and validate that citizen action can be effective at sub-national and national levels and influence the broad good governance agenda.



# **CHAPTER 4:**

**CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE  
CIVIL SOCIETY-LED  
GOOD GOVERNANCE  
PROGRAMS**

To illustrate the evidence presented in Chapter 3, we have selected and reviewed programs that use a well-defined approach based on a theory of change, operate at grassroots level, are led by CSOs in developing countries, and cover more than one country. The programs selected are:

- *Citizen Voice and Accountability Process* of World Vision
- *Community Score Card (CSC) Program* of CARE
- Global Partnership for Social Accountability
- *Community Mobilization to Combat Corruption, Citizens Fighting Corruption, Citizens Against Corruption, Enhancing the Impact of Citizen-Led Transparency Initiative for Good Governance*, and decade long good governance and anti-corruption programs in Mongolia and the Philippines of PTF

These examples are intended to demonstrate that a foundation for expanding CSO-led social accountability and civic engagement programs already exists. Due to space and time constraints we have selected only four multi-country programs. Yet in reality hundreds of such programs exist at community and sub-national level in most countries where enabling environment permits CSOs to engage.

## CITIZEN VOICE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM OF WORLD VISION

**World Vision** is one of the world's leading humanitarian organizations implementing programs of community development, emergency relief and promotion of justice in 100 countries, with some 40 000 total (including part-time and temporary) staff.

World Vision's *Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) Process* aims through collaborative, non-confrontational dialogue between service providers and users to empower users to monitor, seek accountability and take collective responsibility for improved service delivery. The program gives citizens opportunity to express their own opinions about what makes a good school, clinic or government service and to generate their own indicators of what constitutes a good service.<sup>50</sup>

CVA programs generally take place in three phases:

- The first phase enables ***citizen engagement*** through a process of sensitizing citizens on how to engage productively. This involves guiding citizens in understanding policy options and objectives and their engagement rights. These initial steps then lead to further education and building of networks.

- The second phase is a process of broader ***engagement via community gatherings***. This process involves establishing CVA working groups, developing and monitoring of standards (e.g. teacher pupil ratios), voting on scorecards, and having interface meetings with service providers. The latter are aimed at building issue recognition, agreed actions to address those issues and trust between service users and suppliers. If all goes well a SMART Action Plan is agreed with Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Realistic and Time-bound actions.
- ***Improving services and influencing policy*** constitutes the third phase of the process. Obviously executing the Action Plan is fundamental, key to which is individual responsibility for “doing” specified follow-up. It is important that the CSOs involved lead the monitoring and reporting process. During the activity, further building of networks takes place with input solicited from the service providers or relevant authorities. Through this iterative process citizens develop trust between themselves, the users, and the providers of services, placing the users in a stronger position to advocate change and influence policy decisions.

Through these programs, World Vision has concluded that civic engagement can accelerate development effectiveness, sustain gains, reduce inequity and better connect citizens and programs. World Vision briefs indicate that a number of accountability tools are effective, including score cards, social audits, and public expenditure tracking. CVA programs highlight the importance of interface meetings with authorities to encourage performance and build trust.

World Vision has evaluated a number of CVA programs across the globe. For example, the CVA programs in Uganda have resulted in a 9 percent increase in test scores, an 8-10 percent increase in pupil attendance and a 13 percent reduction in teacher absenteeism. Regarding health, the CVA programs contributed to a 33 percent drop in mortality rates in under 5-year-olds and a 20 percent increase in out-patient services. World Vision concludes that by putting citizens at the center of their own development ,rather than allowing national authorities or international organizations to lead, results in increase of 16 percent in program success and sustainability.<sup>51</sup> Other countries where this program has been implemented and evaluated include Armenia, Kosovo, Romania, Pakistan and Lebanon.<sup>52</sup>

## COMMUNITY SCORE CARD – CARE

**CARE** is an INGO operating in 94 countries with 1,000 poverty-fighting development and humanitarian-aid projects.

CARE has adopted a *community score card (CSC) approach*<sup>53</sup> which utilizes citizen participation to help insure the effectiveness of the programs it supports. A key

conclusion it has reached on reviewing its scorecard programs in Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania is the importance of adapting the scorecards to the national context.<sup>54</sup> Some of the key findings of its programs were:

- The need to provide for an “accountability sandwich.” “Demand-side” activities originating from citizen voice and/or user demands require a willingness and responsibility to respond on the “supply side.” Depending on context, the supply side response may need “top-down” pressure to get change to happen. Top-down pressure in Rwanda proved particularly important.
- Buy-in from decision makers needs to be secured early and maintained. Nevertheless, the CARE assessment indicates that such buy-in can be co-opted by the State as was the case in Ethiopia. In Malawi, the training of local health teams was essential to securing and maintaining that buy-in.
- Multi-stakeholder partnerships are key to achieving impact. The CARE evaluation notes that discrete interface meetings are not enough to achieve results. Program managers and citizens need to ensure the ongoing maintenance of relationships with authorities and other stakeholders. Other stakeholders could include academics or third-party champions that have the clout and status to have their voices heard.
- Solving collective action problems that involve distinct individual groups often requires third party actors to bring them together. For example, clients/users, services providers and suppliers of materials often cannot work together unless local organizations or leaders intervene to encourage them to work towards a common goal and solve coordination failures.
- Finally, the review concluded that there was evidence of tangible impact in service delivery improvements, with positive effects witnessed in responsiveness and community empowerment. There was no evidence of institutional impact. This is not to say community action does not have a transformational impact, but the causal chains are too long to demonstrate this with any certainty.

## PARTNERSHIP FOR TRANSPARENCY (PTF)

The [Partnership for Transparency \(PTF\)](#) seeks to advance innovative citizen-led approaches to improve governance, increase transparency, promote the rule of law and reduce corruption in low income and emerging countries. Alongside CSOs, PTF has mobilized expertise and resources for 246 projects in the last 15 years.<sup>55</sup> Many of these projects have had an important impact and all have provided valuable lessons for effective civil society participation.

A central tenet of PTF philosophy is that governance will only improve if citizens organize themselves to demand reform. The contention is that governments have a greater tendency to correct failings in the face of legitimate pressure from those it serves. PTF aims to help CSOs acquire the knowledge, skills, abilities and tools to advocate and monitor for improved delivery of public (and private) sector policy, services and processes.<sup>56</sup>

PTF also helps development agencies to better assist CSOs to have voice and to encourage government agencies to respond constructively to the demands of citizens. PTF emphasizes constructive engagement between CSOs and the authorities.

Some notable PTF supported programs include:

- *Community Mobilization to Combat Corruption program* (2008–2013) covering 42 projects in 22 countries and distributing \$1.2 million in grants.<sup>57</sup>
- *Citizens Fighting Corruption program* (2009–2010) in India covering 12 projects and distributing \$330 000 in grants.<sup>58</sup>
- *Citizens Against Corruption program* (2003–2013) covering 27 projects and distributing \$692 000 in grants.<sup>59</sup>
- *Enhancing the Impact of Citizen-Led Transparency Initiative for Good Governance* (2012–2014) covering 5 projects and distributing \$200k in grants.<sup>60</sup>
- *Decade long good governance and anti-corruption programs in Mongolia<sup>61</sup> and the Philippines (2003-ongoing)<sup>62</sup>*

A review of these programs indicate the following five categories of results.

- 1) ***Improved transparency.*** Through a variety of tools, including community score cards, social audits, and participatory budgeting, CSO-led projects were able to improve transparency. Improved transparency led to more accountability, which in turn had an impact on reducing corrupt activity. With reduced corruption, money was saved and results improved. This progression illustrates the importance of prioritizing transparency, by revealing information and engaging productively with that information. For example, transparency campaigns in India resulted in Right to Information (RTI) laws in over 1,000 villages and in over 2,000 RTI applications. In Croatia, citizens successfully lobbied for a new Public Procurement Act and a digital public procurement database was established which got 6,000 searches per month. Transparency International India persuaded India's largest State Owned Enterprises to sign Integrity Pacts, which among other outcomes has resulted in 6 successful prosecutions.<sup>63</sup>
- 2) ***Reduction in Waste and Corruption.*** CSO-led projects generated measurable reductions in corruption and waste. Examples include the reduction of medicine

prices and their timely delivery in 28 hospitals in the Philippines resulting in an estimated saving of \$750 000. Waste was estimated to fall from 30 to 10 percent in a large university in Cameroon through budget monitoring, greater transparency and more disciplined procurement. In Latvia, budget monitoring led to construction costs in the National Library being reduced by some €5.5 million. In Azerbaijan, civil society monitoring revealed \$17 million resources missing in the Azerbaijan Oil Fund with some of these resources returned and the Fund negotiating an [Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative \(EITI\)](#) code of ethics. The same CSO exposed a \$10.4 million discrepancy in a railway construction project.<sup>64</sup>

- 3) ***Improved Responsiveness of Public Officials.*** PTF partners were able to interact and build relationships with governmental officials by incorporating constructive engagement. These officials, be they incentivized by reputational gains, fear of exposure from accountability mechanisms or other motivations, often responded by seeking to fix service delivery problems which CSOs brought to their attention. Such an approach enhances the probability of project sustainability by establishing 'champions' on the inside. Examples include the better use and maintenance of public vehicles in the Philippines by local government officials following monitoring and engagement by a local CSO. The use of data and results of a survey by an Argentinian CSO allowed local government officials and legislators to enact and deliver on specific reform initiatives.<sup>65</sup>
- 4) ***Participation and Inclusion of Citizens.*** PTF supported projects have resulted in a large number of citizens being sensitized and trained in a panoply of good governance and anti-corruption initiatives. The resulting awareness and heightened education has resulted in localized culture changes with better informed citizenry, more responsive governments and more efficient public services. Examples include the training of 70 volunteers in a conditional, cash transfer (CCT) program in the Philippines, which benefited and informed 4,616 households.<sup>66</sup> In Kenya, Social Auditors were carefully selected and trained to monitor constituency development funds.<sup>67</sup> In Mongolia, training has benefited both the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission and the CSOs with which they engage.<sup>68</sup>
- 5) ***Improved Public Service Delivery.*** PTF supported projects resulted in timelier, less costly and better quality public services. In the Philippines, textbook delivery to students increased to 95%, whereas prior to the program 40 percent of textbooks procured did not reach their final destination. Moreover the medicines distribution chain from central warehouses to clinics around the Philippines was made more efficient through reduced waste, fraud and errors and helped deliver medicines to patients in a more accurate and timely manner.<sup>69</sup>

## GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY (GPSA)

The [Global Partnership for Social Accountability \(GPSA\)](#) was established in 2012 by the World Bank to empower citizen voice and support government capacity to respond effectively. The GPSA is centered around constructive engagement between governments and civil society to create an enabling environment in which citizen feedback is used to solve fundamental problems in service delivery and to strengthen the performance of public institutions. To achieve its goals the GPSA aims to provide strategic and sustained support to CSOs and governments for social accountability initiatives aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability. GPSA builds on the World Bank's direct engagement with public sector actors as well as a network of partner organizations.<sup>70</sup>

Fifty-two countries have opted-into the program. The GPSA currently has 30 projects in 27 countries. GPSA provides grants to CSOs (and networks of CSOs) working on social accountability, for institutional development and for knowledge generation and dissemination activities. Grants focus on specific programs that help governments and public institutions solve problems through social accountability processes that involve citizen feedback and participation, with a special emphasis on the extreme poor and marginalized populations.<sup>71</sup>

As of May 2018, the GPSA has thirteen projects in the education sector, eleven in health, two in water, two in social protection and one each in extractives and agriculture.<sup>72</sup> The World Bank-defined themes that these projects cover are: decentralization (72%), local government (67%), budget monitoring (51%), conflict prevention (15%), and public procurement and human rights each (5%).

Notable examples of outcomes are:

- ***Moldova -Accountability in Education.*** GPSA provided a grant for \$697,000 to support efforts over the 2014 to 2018 period, covering 80 schools and some 7 300 participants from parents, school administrators, pupils through to CSOs and local councilors. The result is that 1,200 school administrators, teachers and parents in local coalitions are holding school managers accountable by participating in budget monitoring, scorecards and public hearings. Moreover, a user-friendly website has been launched to share experiences and performance indicators with both participating and non-participating schools.<sup>73</sup>
- ***Tajikistan – Improving water quality and sanitation services.*** A project led by Oxfam Tajikistan from 2014 -2018 with a grant of \$850,000 supported improved social accountability in water supply and sanitation services in 8 districts and Dushanbe. The support has resulted in consumers now being aware of their water rights and a common standard for drinking water supply and sanitation being agreed between civil society and the authorities. Moreover, 80% of water service

providers receive customer feedback and it is reported that customer complaints are properly recorded and followed up.<sup>74</sup>

- **Malawi – Education transparency.** A project led by CARE from 2014-2019 with a grant of \$950,000 supports civil society efforts to reduce teacher absenteeism and promote greater transparency in the procurement and delivery of education materials. Results to date indicate a 15 percent drop in teacher absenteeism. There has been a 30 percent increase in community participation in schools and 7 650 community members have been trained in procurement principles and monitoring delivery of education materials and teacher absenteeism.<sup>75</sup>
- **Ghana – Budget accountability in health and education.** A 2014 -2018 project with \$850,000 of GPSA support covering 30 districts has led to important social accountability reactions from authorities. After persistent requests, the government has doubled education grants and increased health investments, which has decreased out of pocket expenses for students and increased access to immunization and family planning services. Seven thousand six hundred and twelve citizens were made aware of local and national budgets and participated in budget planning and implementation. Moreover 90 percent (of the 350) District Citizens Monitoring Committees are now versed on budget analysis.<sup>76</sup>

GPSA's social accountability approach<sup>77</sup> has four key elements to their program operation:

- 1) **A solution driven approach.** GPSA supported activities focus on citizen feedback to better understand causes and develop appropriate solutions to address specific governance and service delivery problems that affect citizens' well-being.
- 2) **Context-based.** GPSA places a lot of emphasis on understanding the context of the actors, institutions and processes that are already involved in solving governance problems to minimize duplication of ongoing initiatives while targeting what is needed in additional support.
- 3) **Constructive engagement.** GPSA supported activities aim to ensure that the feedback that is generated from social accountability is shared and discussed with the public-sector institutions involved, particularly those with the decision-making power to translate the feedback obtained into actual changes.

**Multi-stakeholder coalitions and partnerships.** The GPSA recognizes that complex governance and service delivery issues call for concerted action of various actors that have direct or indirect interests in supporting resolution.

**Mobilizing and supporting CSOs.** The projects supported by World Vision, Care, PTF and GPSA are just a few examples among many. The illustrate that CSOs around the world can make a major contribution to the accomplishment of SDG16 governance targets when mobilized and supported effectively.



# **CHAPTER 5:**

**ACTIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS**

# **TO EXPAND**

**CSO CONTRIBUTIONS**

# **TO GOOD GOVERNANCE**

The case for expanding CSO engagement in promoting good governance according to the agendas of the SGs and IFIs is supported by the following key elements:

- CSOs are recognized as full partners in Agenda 2030 and as key stakeholders in IFI operations. They are expected to play meaningful roles in promoting transparency, inclusion, participatory policy and program design, reducing corruption, grievance redress, and holding the governments and IFIs accountable.
- A central and growing role CSOs have played for decades is to assist citizens to be aware of their rights and to engage with government to increase responsiveness to their needs— social accountability. SDG16 holds governments accountable for greater attention to the most vulnerable and neglected citizens, calling for an ever greater CSO role as an intermediary.
- There is significant research evidence that well-designed CSO-led programs adapted to context can improve transparency, responsiveness, accountability of the state and reduce corruption, in public service delivery and thus can play an important role in helping to achieve many of the goals of Agenda 2030: SDG3-- Health, SDG4-Education, SDG5—Gender Equality, SDG6—Clean Water and Sanitation and SDG11—Cities and Communities.
- Initial reports of SDG implementation suggest that the level of CSO engagement remains limited and underfunded. Without a significant intensification of effort, financing, action research and collaboration among stakeholders, realizing the SDGs is unlikely. CSO networks, ongoing and recent social accountability programs around the world, and research findings provide a solid foundation to expand CSO programs for improving governance.

**An expansion of civic engagement programs for enhancing governance will require accelerated and increased action by CSOs as well as their supporters in governments, IFIs, official donors, INGOs and philanthropy organizations. We have developed the following recommendations for stakeholders to effectively respond to this call to action.**

**RECOMMENDATION 1: CSOs should accelerate and expand their programs using entry points emerging from SDG16 national plans and IFI stakeholder and CSO engagement policies.** These policies are opening up significant new opportunities for grassroots CSOs to constructively engage with authorities to improve the delivery of corruption-free and responsive public services; and participate in design and delivery of development policies and programs.

For example, (i) stakeholder engagement is mandatory in all World Bank financed projects approved after October 2018; and (ii) the ADB, as part of its recently adopted [Strategy](#)

2030, has committed to expand collaboration with CSOs, support corruption free services and adopt anti-corruption plans in the projects it funds.

The following illustrative list of entry points for intensifying CSO engagement is indicative of the vastly underutilized opportunities available to assert influence.

- Assess local context for engagement opportunities in planning, implementation and monitoring of national SDG16 action plans and intensify involvement. A [How-to-Guide](#) is available from the [TAP Network](#).
- Seek to influence and monitor the [Stakeholder Engagement Plan \(SEP\)](#) required under the [Environment and Social Framework \(ESF\)](#) for projects financed by the World Bank after October 1, 2018. The ESF embodies certain rights and resources for 'project affected and other interested parties' regarding access to information, consultation, feedback loops, inclusion, grievance redress, third party monitoring and SEP.<sup>78</sup> The scope of this opportunity is illustrated by the fact that in recent years the World Bank has approved more than 200 investment projects for a total amount of about \$40 billion per year across most developing countries.<sup>79</sup>
- Work with the UNDP to find entry points for monitoring SDG16 and other targets. Governance is one of six '[Signature Solutions](#)' offered by UNDP, suggesting it may serve as a point of entry for CSOs in developing and emerging countries seeking partnership and support. The UNDP's [SDG16 Hub](#) provides guidance and tools to assist stakeholders in SDG implementation, and its website calls specifically for reviewing national policies on SDG targets, including the fight against corruption.
- Seek to facilitate the implementation of IFI citizen engagement and CSO collaboration policies. IFI policies provide for CSO engagement in information disclosure, consultations, grievance redress, beneficiary empowerment, third party monitoring, and beneficiary feedback loops. The ADB publicly discloses CSO engagement opportunities for each project in the project documents.<sup>80</sup> Information on World Bank projects can be accessed using its [project documents database](#) and access to information policy.<sup>81</sup> These institutions approve hundreds of projects involving billions of dollars.
- The [International Development Association \(IDA\)](#), part of the World Bank that helps the world's poorest countries, has committed that during 2017-2020 it will integrate user feedback and/or enhanced grievance redress mechanisms in at least 10 IDA countries and will support at least one-third of IDA countries to operationalize commitments made under the [Open Government Partnership](#) to strengthen transparent, accountable, participatory, and inclusive governments.<sup>82</sup> CSOs may be able to facilitate implementation of these commitments.
- IMF bilateral surveillance and Fund-supported programs are expected to include analysis and policy advice on vulnerabilities to corruption and weak governance. In addition, for countries that volunteer, the IMF will do an assessment of whether

their policies and systems criminalize and prosecute bribery and have mechanisms to stop money laundering. The IMF is reaching out to CSOs for dialogue and these areas provide targets of opportunity to engage.<sup>83</sup>

**RECOMMENDATION 2: CSOs should follow an evidence-based approach in designing and implementing their programs for maximum effectiveness.** We recommend the following guiding principles for CSOs to build an evidence based approach:

- Begin with context and political economy analysis. Evidence shows that success requires an understanding of and adaptation to the local context and some minimum conditions such as willingness and capacity of certain key authorities and communities to engage in constructive dialogue, existence of CSOs that have trust and credibility in the community and that can mobilize both citizens and government officials to engage, access to information, mitigating risk of elite capture, political window of opportunities etc. The focus of the analysis should be to ask what conditions are absolutely necessary for success and make a realistic assessment of the extent to which they exist or can be ensured. It should be recognized that right conditions may not be possible in all situations and it is best not to start until things have changed.
- We recommend that CSOs focus their efforts on areas where success is more likely, such as monitoring public service delivery and public procurement and expenditures; and align their contributions to help achieve the relevant SDG targets and/or project development objectives in IFI funded operations.
- Aim for a long-term and iterative approach. We recommend that CSOs formulate programs of adequate duration, with time periods adapted to available funding. This is not to discourage, but to be realistic, and perhaps less ambitious, about what can be accomplished in short time frames. This will require combating the incentives facing both funders and recipients to pack too much into individual projects, with unreasonably high expectations.
- Seek to formalize engagement with authorities. CSO initiatives for good governance have greater influence when government policy makers and program implementers are receptive to dialogue and commit to working together for shared goals. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) is an often-used to record the understandings and modalities for constructive engagement. When pursuing engagement at the local level it is helpful to get higher level authorities to signal that they endorse the grassroots initiative. In some situations, formal structures (such as consultative groups, steering councils, advisory councils) are established.
- Use and generate research evidence by adequately defining the outcomes to be achieved and indicators of success. The design of CSO programs should include: (i) a results framework with results indicators; (ii) key lessons from relevant research;

and (iii) collaboration with a researcher to ensure suitable methodologies for drawing statistically valid conclusions on performance.

- Monitor and report contributions to SDG/IFI programs. Several platforms for sharing information at global level are available under SDG and IFI frameworks, such as:
  - Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) of Agenda 2030 prepared by countries should provide for CSO participation. Where they do not, CSOs have produced ‘[shadow reports](#)’ in parallel with the government.
  - The [Partnerships for SDGs Online Platform](#), a UN global registry of voluntary commitments and multi-stakeholder partnerships in support of the SDGs.
  - All IFIs provide space for stories and blogs from stakeholders.<sup>84</sup> Country offices have also set up regular dialogue platforms.
  - International NGO Initiatives provide other venues for reporting contributions to SDG16 such as the [TAP Network](#).
  - The UNDP’s [SDG16 Hub](#) is practitioner-driven and is intended to help people seeking knowledge on SDG16 and desiring to engage with others on the SDG16 agenda. It provides guidance and tools for reviewing national policies on SDG targets, including the fight against corruption.

**RECOMMENDATION 3: Governments should encourage active CSO participation in the design and implementation of operations.** Early indications from the VNRs submitted by many countries in 2017 indicate that CSOs are being engaged in a scattered and uneven manner. We recommend that governments institutionalize active civil society contributions to deliberations regarding SDG strategy, policymaking and programs including those for good governance and corruption. Where this is unlikely, CSOs should seek good governance champions in government where available for collaboration.

We endorse the call for accelerated stakeholders action by hundreds of CSO from around the world that are members of the [TAP Network](#). In particular we would like to highlight the actions contained in the [Rome Civil Society Declaration on SDG16+](#):

- “Scale up investments to civil society and grassroots approaches that respect their independence towards implementing the SDG16+ agenda by increasing global aid flows and the percentage of ODA, national budgets, and sector-specific funding, with a particular emphasis on the most fragile contexts, addressing human security needs, promoting access to justice and legal empowerment efforts, and putting the furthest behind first.
- Revise budgeting processes to provide overall support to SDG16+ priority areas, and ensure that these processes are inclusive and participatory.

- Create an “SDG16+ Challenge Fund” to help support civil society organizations working at the grassroots level to advance the ambitions of the agenda.
- Improve capacity building for civil society to address gaps around data collection, monitoring and spotlight reporting on SDG16, awareness raising, and inclusion in national Voluntary National Reviews, public policy and budgetary processes.
- Engage local and grassroots civil society that otherwise are difficult to reach and mobilize, buttressing existing civil society resources and tools to enable these local actors to support SDG1
- Ensure core, ongoing, and sustained financial support for CSOs to support capacity building for implementation.
- Recognize the critical role civil society can play in capacitating and strengthening the ability of Member States and other actors to implement SDG16+ commitments.
- Develop practical analytical and operational guidance on how SDG16+ can best foster impact for other SDGs.
- Create mechanisms to allow inclusive and participatory policy-making on all
- Integrate civil society and other stakeholders within the range of sustainable development activities - from planning and budgeting conversations to processes seeking social cohesion, lasting peace, and justice.
- Encourage and promote meaningful participation of civil society in national reporting processes and include its inputs into official government analyses.
- Create meaningful opportunities for civil society working at the local and grassroots levels, especially from the Global South, to engage and have a voice in key policy fora on implementing the 2030 Agenda.
- End persecution and harassment of civil society for engaging on SDG16+ issues and accountability mechanisms, such as the Voluntary National Reviews.
- Expand civil society space and create an enabling environment in which civil society can freely and safely operate and assemble, in line with the 2016 *UN Human Rights* in conflict- affected and fragile contexts.”<sup>85</sup>

**RECOMMENDATION 4: Governments, IFIs and other donors should adopt guidelines to fund grassroots level CSOs to implement more effective citizen/stakeholder engagement in the IFI funded projects.** IFIs and other donors generally require stakeholder engagement in programs funded by them but fail to explicitly allocate funds for such activities. As a result, stakeholder engagement, particularly during implementation and monitoring, may not happen and potential benefits do not

materialize. IFIs should consider adopting the proposal recently put forth by the members of [TAP Network](#) to create an “SDG16+ Challenge Fund” to help support CSOs at grass roots level to advance the ambitions of SDG16 and IFIs citizen/stakeholder engagement policies.

We also suggest that IFIs adopt guidelines that require staff to explicitly budget funds for stakeholder engagement (about 1% is the suggested norm) and give priority to grassroots CSOs for designing and implementing such engagement. This is an indicative figure representing the need for a simple, explicit budgeting practice across the board to incorporate into all development activities. To the extent possible, budgets for third party monitoring should be provided separately from the project budget and the oversight of the project authorities, to avoid conflict of interest. We recommend that INGOs and private philanthropy organizations set up funding mechanisms to support CSO engagement in IFI funded projects.

**RECOMMENDATION 5: International NGOs and foundations should take action to leverage opportunities opened by IFI stakeholder and CSO engagement policies.** These policies have the potential, in addition to promoting development effectiveness, to: (a) open up space for civil society by promoting expanded CSO roles in designing and implementing stakeholder engagement in IFI-funded projects; and (b) create substantial business opportunities for CSOs by contracting them to work on stakeholder engagement. To take advantage of this potential, CSOs need the funding and skills to participate during the project identification and preparation phases of the project cycle with the objective of maximizing CSO roles and business opportunities. There is enormous potential for doing this but no incentives on part of government and IFIs teams working on project design and procurement plans.

We recommend that INGOs and private philanthropy organizations expand their funding for grassroots CSOs to expand their up-stream (to integrate greater CSO engagement in project design) and downstream (to monitor implementation of CSO engagement) in IFI-funded projects. This could be done by expanding direct CSO funding mechanisms as well as through trust funds established at IFIs. Specific suggestions that we offer include:

- Fund developing country CSOs to influence and monitor the design and implementation of stakeholder engagement plans in each of the hundreds of projects they finance each year worldwide.
- We recommend that the funding allocations for programs that are aligned with SDG and IFI governance should be substantially increased. This will help CSOs directly contribute to realization of these targets and complement government action. For maximum impact, such funding should be programmatic and could be provided in tranches linked to adaptive learning and intermediate results.

- IFIs are courting philanthropists, foundations and bilateral donors to contribute or set up trust funds with IFIs as trustees. Examples of existing trust funds are the Global Partnership for Social Accountability and the Partnership Fund for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG Fund), both established by the World Bank. Channeling money to CSOs through such trust funds has many advantages for donors. Among them are opportunities to leverage IFI funds, use the IFI convening power and access to government, IFI infrastructure for managing funds and supervising their use, and channeling funds to CSOs in countries that otherwise place restriction on foreign funds flow to local CSOs. We recommend that private philanthropists, foundations and bilateral donors collaborate with IFIs to set up funds, or windows within existing funds, for CSOs in developing countries to promote stakeholder engagement and good governance.

**RECOMMENDATION 6: IFIs should be proactive in encouraging governments to engage CSOs in good governance goals.** IFIs generally, and multilateral development banks (MDBs)<sup>iv</sup> specifically, have important roles to play in promoting but under perform in engaging civil society to expand their contributions to good governance. IFIs have commendable policies for engaging with CSOs such as participation, citizen engagement, stakeholder engagement, collaboration with CSOs, access to information, safeguards, and social inclusion (see *Annex V: Comparison of MDB Policies, Procedures and Institutional Arrangements for Civil Society Engagement*).

However, IFIs do not monitor and report on number of CSOs they fund, the amount of funding allocated/awarded for CSO contracts and capacity building, and results and impact of CSO work. In contrast, they provide this information in detail for consulting firms and suppliers of goods. CSOs are lumped with consulting firms and asked to compete with them despite structural and other differences between for profit firms and non-profit CSOs.

On the positive side, IFIs have set up instruments to provide direct support for CSO capacity building. They have the capacity to set up multi-donor trust funds that include governments as well as private philanthropic foundations. However, IFIs have not set up any major trust funds to help CSOs promote good governance. They have the ability to nudge the governments to open up space for civic engagement through their policy advice and policy based lending.

We recommend a proactive effort by IFIs to ramp up CSO engagement in operations funded by them through the following actions:

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<sup>iv</sup> Multilateral development banks refers to: The World Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Development Bank.

- Identify elements of citizen and stakeholder engagement and anti-corruption action plans in projects that might best be implemented by, or in partnership with, CSOs. This would be especially useful in public service delivery projects and to monitor public expenditure in conjunction with programmatic budget and results based lending in weak governance environments.
- Include explicit provisions for CSOs to be contracted to help with stakeholder engagement, governance and anti-corruption plans.
- Make changes in financing facilities and business processes that would make it easier to contract CSOs.
- Assess country policies and systems for stakeholder engagement as part of country and sector assessments (systematic country diagnostic in case of the World Bank) and use dialogue with recipient governments to argue the case for providing a more enabling policy and legislative environment that will support more effective operationalization of IFI policies on stakeholder engagement and beneficiary participation.
- Expand the practice of Including prior actions in development policy lending and results based lending to open up civic space.
- Establish a system to monitor and report the number of CSOs funded, the amount of funding allocated/awarded for CSO contracts and for capacity building, and results and impact of CSO work.
- Expand support for capacity building on civic engagement for both CSOs and government officials

**RECOMMENDATION 7: Donors Should Support CSO Networks and Coalitions.** A CSO or community acting on its own may have limited impact. CSOs are far more likely to have impact if they pool together in their quest for change. Indeed, coalitions between different groups and at different levels (local, national, and international) have been shown to be effective in bringing about change and helping to achieve sustainability. Networks need dedicated funding and staffing to enable them to work as equal partners with the public sector and private sector.



# ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> A meta-analysis of the impact of corruption and quality of governance on growth is presented as Annex 2 in the International Monetary Fund's 2019 paper on framework for enhanced fund engagement on governance accessed at <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018/04/20/pp030918-review-of-1997-guidance-note-on-governance>

<sup>2</sup> See full list of SDG16 targets and indicators in Annex II or visit <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16>.

<sup>3</sup> World Bank Group Governance Indicators:  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1331677X.2016.1169701>

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Council (2018) *Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: Report of the Secretary-General*.

<sup>5</sup>United Nations. "Sustainable Development Goals." Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform.  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>

<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this paper we recognize the following RDBs: Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations, "Sustainable Development Goal 16 Progress & Info"  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16>

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Council (2018) *Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: Report of the Secretary-General*, pg 16. Accessed at: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/report/2018/secretary-general-sdg-report-2018--EN.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, pg 17.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2018) *2018 Synthesis of Voluntary National Reviews*, pg 11. Accessed at:  
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<sup>14</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace (2019) *SDG16+ Progress Report: A comprehensive global audit of progress on available SDG16 indicators*, pg 4. Accessed at:  
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<sup>15</sup> SDG Data Initiative (2017) *SDG16 Data Initiative Report*. Accessed at: <https://sdg16report.org/>

<sup>16</sup> United Nations (2019) *Conference in preparation for HLPF 2019: "Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies: SDG16+ implementation and the path towards leaving no one behind"*  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf/2019/SDG16Conference2019>

<sup>17</sup> SDG Data Initiative (2017) *SDG16 Data Initiative Report*.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> The TAP Network is a broad network of CSOs that works to ensure that open, inclusive, accountable, effective governance and peaceful societies are at the heart of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and that civil society are recognized and mobilized as indispensable partners in the design, implementation of and accountability for sustainable development policies, at all levels. See more at: <http://tapnetwork2030.org/>.

<sup>21</sup> TAP Network (2016) *Goal 16 Advocacy Toolkit: A practical guide for stakeholders for national-level advocacy around Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies*, pg 5. Accessed at: [https://tapnetwork2030.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/TAP\\_Toolkit\\_FINAL\\_web.pdf](https://tapnetwork2030.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/TAP_Toolkit_FINAL_web.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> TAP Network. *Synthesis Report: TAP Network Survey on Strategic Priorities and Advocacy for the 2019 HLPFs*, pg 12.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Not long after adoption of the SDGs, a group of stakeholders came together to promote SDG16 and associated actions under a new label: SDG16+. The [Pathfinders for SDG16+](#) are a group of UN member states, international organizations, global partnerships, and other partners working to accelerate delivery of the SDG targets for peace, justice and inclusion. The group is led by Brazil, Sierra Leone, and Switzerland and co-convened by the [New York University Center on International Cooperation \(CIC\)](#). A related entity, the [SDG16+ Forum](#) provides a platform to share best practices, while applying SDG16+ as a lynchpin from which to explore and strengthen interlinkages across the 2030 Agenda.

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<sup>29</sup> See Clark, John (2013) "*Citizens Against Corruption*" *Final Evaluation*. Available at: [https://www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PTF\\_GTF-Final-Evaluation-Report\\_26June-2.pdf](https://www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PTF_GTF-Final-Evaluation-Report_26June-2.pdf); and Clark (2013) "*Good Governance: Community Mobilization to Combat Corruption*" *Final Evaluation*. Available at: [https://www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PTFDGF-Final-Evaluation-Report-26\\_6\\_2013.pdf](https://www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PTFDGF-Final-Evaluation-Report-26_6_2013.pdf)

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<sup>83</sup> See the Civil Society webpage at IMF website for past consultations and future opportunities <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Partners/civil-society>

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# **ANNEX I:**

## **REFERENCES OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW**

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**ANNEX II:**

**SDG 16**

**TARGETS & INDICATORS**

TARGETS		INDICATORS	
16.1	Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	16.1.1	Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age
		16.1.2	Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause
		16.1.3	Proportion of population subjected to physical, psychological or sexual violence in the previous 12 months
		16.1.4	Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live
16.2	End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children	16.2.1	Percentage of children aged 1–17 years who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month
		16.2.2	Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation
		16.2.3	Proportion of young women and men aged 18-29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18
16.3	Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all	16.3.1	Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms
		16.3.2	Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population
16.4	By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime	16.4.1	Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows
		16.4.2	Proportion of seized and small arms and light weapons that are recorded and traced, in accordance with international standards and legal instruments

16.5	Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms	16.5.1	Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months
		16.5.2	Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months
16.6	Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels	16.6.1	Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)
		16.6.2	Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services
16.7	Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	16.7.1	Proportions of positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups) in public institutions (national and local legislatures, public service, and judiciary) compared to national distributions
		16.7.2	Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group
16.8	Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance	16.8.1	Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations
16.9	By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration	16.9.1	Proportion of children under 5 years whose births have been registered with a civil authority, by age

16.10	Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements	16.10.1	Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months
		16.10.2	Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information
16.A	Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime	16.A.1	Existence of independent national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles
16.B	Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development	16.B.1	Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law



# **ANNEX III:**

**International Monetary Fund  
and Multi-lateral Development Banks (MDB)  
Policies on Good Governance**

## INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

In April 2018, The [International Monetary Fund \(IMF\)](#) adopted an Enhanced Framework on Governance issues in response to a request of the IMF Executive Board that represents its 189 member countries. The policy paper<sup>5</sup> includes an empirical analysis of effects of weak governance and corruption on growth that shows that high corruption is associated with significantly lower growth, investment, foreign direct investment, and tax revenues. It also finds that they are associated with higher inequality and lower inclusive growth. These significant macroeconomic effects provide the rationale for the IMF's new Framework.

The New Framework calls for:

- a. A systematic approach to assess the nature and severity of governance vulnerabilities including corruption. The assessment will cover: (i) fiscal governance; financial sector oversight; central bank governance and operations; market regulation; rule of law; and anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism.
- b. An assessment of the economic impact of the governance vulnerabilities, severity of the vulnerabilities and importance of addressing the identified vulnerabilities for achieving the goals of member country's program;
- c. Policy recommendations to address the assessed vulnerabilities. These will be tailored to the severity of corruption and country circumstances.
- d. Member countries to "volunteer to have their legal and institutional frameworks assessed by the Fund—to see whether they criminalize and prosecute foreign bribery and have mechanisms to stop the laundering and concealment of dirty money."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The new Framework is based on a review of the 1997 Guidance Note on Governance. This section is largely based on the full report on the New Framework accessed on 9 July 2018 at <http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018/04/20/pp030918-review-of-1997-guidance-note-on-governance>

<sup>6</sup> Blog by IMF Managing Director Ms. Christine Lagarde- "Shining the Bright Light into the Dark Corners of Weak Governance and Corruption" accessed at <https://blogs.imf.org/2018/04/22/shining-a-bright-light-into-the-dark-corners-of-weak-governance-and-corruption/>. She notes "I am gratified that nine countries—the entire G7 plus Austria and the Czech Republic—have already volunteered for this assessment."

## WORLD BANK GROUP (WB)

The [World Bank](#) has supported programs for enhancing public sector governance for decades through its Global Governance Practice (GGP) and predecessors. The GGP “supports... client countries to help them build capable, efficient, open, inclusive and accountable institutions.” Its current [strategic priorities](#) focus on five key areas. Each of these areas offers potential for CSO engagement.

- Strengthening public policy processes to achieve better results. Focus in on coordination within executive branch, across branches in the government and with the private sector and citizens through consultations and participation.
- Promoting effective resource management. Focus is on revenue mobilization, public expenditure, financial management and civil service reform. Openness, transparency and accountability are key means and offer potential for CSO participation;
- Reinforcing public service delivery in sectors such as water, health, education and transport. Openness, transparency, citizen engagement and beneficiary feedback are considered essential to reach the poorest and marginalized.
- Strengthening the public-private interface through more effective systems for public investment management, transparency, corporate governance, regulations, and corruption free procurement processes.
- Understanding the underlying drivers and enablers of policy effectiveness in achieving growth, equity, and security. These drivers relate to: openness; transparency; citizen engagement; trust, social cohesion; capture and exclusion.

The new elements in the World Bank’s enhanced good governance priorities are citizen engagement, policy on stakeholder engagement and adoption of “Governance and Institutions” as a Special Theme in IDA18 Replenishment. All of these new elements align closely with the SDG16 governance targets and significantly expand the scope for CSO engagement.

Governance and Institutions as a Special Theme in the [IDA18 Replenishment](#)<sup>7</sup> noting that “governance and institutional capacity touch the World Bank’s work in all sectors-serving as foundation for IDA’s effective investment in growth, resilience, and opportunities.” IDA 18 includes 10 policy commitments and monitorable targets (2017-2020) relating to the Governance and Institutions theme:

- 1) Strengthening domestic resource mobilization in at least a third of IDA countries;
- 2) Improving public expenditure, financial management and procurement through application of: (i) the [PEFA](#) framework for public financial management reform in 10 IDA countries; and (ii) [Methodology for Assessing Procurement Systems 2](#) in 5 IDA countries;
- 3) Strengthening active ownership of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in 10 IDA countries through performance agreements and information disclosure.
- 4) Supporting public administration performance for service delivery in at least 10 IDA countries by identifying and addressing institutional bottlenecks in the health, water, and/or education sectors.
- 5) Supporting institutional capacity to respond to pandemics in at least 25 IDA countries;
- 6) Integrating citizen engagement and beneficiary feedback into service delivery operations by supporting projects in at least 10 IDA countries in the development and implementation of user feedback and/or enhanced grievance redress mechanisms (GRMs) for service delivery that ensure participation by women in these processes.
- 7) Strengthening open, transparent and inclusive governance through Open Government commitments. Support at least one-third of IDA countries to operationalize reform commitments towards the Open Government Partnership (OGP) agenda to strengthen transparent, accountable, participatory, and inclusive governments.

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<sup>7</sup> This section is taken from IDA webpage at the World Bank (<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/what-ida>) and IDA18 Replenishment final report “Towards 2030: Investing in Growth, Resilience and Opportunity”

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/348661486654455091/pdf/112728-correct-file-PUBLIC-Rpt-from-EDs-Additions-to-IDA-Resources-2-9-17-For-Disclosure.pdf>, accessed on 6 July 2018.

- 8) Mitigating Illicit Financial Flows (IFF) by identification and monitoring of IFFs in at least 10 IDA countries.
- 9) Enhancing understanding of governance and institutions in situations of Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) through governance and institutional analysis.
- 10) Operationalizing the 2017 World Development Report on Governance and the Law.

These targets will apply to about 75 of the poorest countries in the world that are eligible to receive concessional IDA funding.

## **AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AfDB)**

In 2013, [African Development Bank \(AfDB\)](#) adopted the Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan, known as GAP II, building on its predecessor GAP I (2008-2012).

GAP I emphasized strengthening policies and institutions to increase effectiveness, transparency, and accountability in the management of Africa's public finance; and improving the investment and business climate for private sector-led growth. It noted the special needs of institution building in conflict and fragile states.

GAP II has three core objectives:

- 1) strengthening governments' capacity for transparent and use of public resources and citizens' ability to hold Governments to account;
- 2) improving outcomes in the sectors and citizen's' ability to monitor them;
- 3) (promoting a business enabling environment which supports Africa's socio-economic transformation, job creation and financial inclusion.

Cross cutting objectives across all three objectives are reducing corruption, gender and regional integration. The Strategy is built around three pillars:

- public sector and economic management
- sector governance and
- investment and business climate.

In line with the [2013-2022 Ten Year Strategy](#), governance is to be mainstreamed in all operations.

## ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB)

The [Asian Development Bank's \(ADB's\)](#) work on governance began in February 1994, when the President issued staff instructions for the development of a working paper on the subject, which was subsequently presented to the Board in May 1995. The same year, the ADB became the first MDB to adopt a [Governance Policy](#) which was followed by the approval of an [Anticorruption Policy](#) in 1998.<sup>8</sup>

The ADB's [Second Governance and Anti-Corruption Action Plan \(GACAP II\)](#) in place since 2006, attempts to operationalize earlier policies by outlining "specific actions toward improving governance and fighting corruption in ADB operations."<sup>9</sup> GACAP II is a risk-based approach to provide a foundation for good governance in state institutions focusing on three key issues: 1) public financial management; 2) procurement systems; and 3) anti-corruption.<sup>10</sup>

GACAP II requires "the ADB and its members to assess risks the priority themes and the measures needed to manage such risks, prior to formulation of country development plans. It also requires mid-term reviews and updates of risk assessments and risk management plans."<sup>11</sup> It targets four key result areas:

- 1) Improve identification and management of governance, institutional, and corruption risks in country development plans
- 2) Strengthen governance and anticorruption components in project and project design
- 3) Strengthen program and project administration and portfolio management
- 4) Improve organizational structure, human resources, and access to expertise

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<sup>8</sup> ADB. "Governance Policies and Strategies." Accessed at: <https://www.adb.org/sectors/governance/policies-strategies>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

The ADB notes that: “The plan emphasizes the involvement of civil society organizations to provide oversight and promote links between ADB member governments and citizens to strengthen participation and improve accountability.”<sup>12</sup> While there is clearly good intention to work with civil society, because the ADB (or any other MDB) does not disclose details on engagements with CSOs, it is unclear to what extent this has been accomplished.

In 2012, the ADB conducted an implementation review of GACAP II. It found that “all the new country partnership strategies (CPSs) address governance risks in the three thematic areas, and recommend mitigation measures for major risks in risk assessment and management plans.” However, it also noted weaknesses in implementation at the project level, and recommends inclusion of governance risks/targets in project monitoring and supervision as well as adequate staff and financial resources.<sup>13</sup>

More recently, the ADB’s draft Strategy 2030 identified governance as one of seven operational priorities.<sup>14</sup> It notes ADB will “support public management reforms to help DMCs improve governance and create an enabling environment for sustainable growth.”<sup>15</sup> It also emphasizes that “combining top-down and bottom-up approaches in monitoring service delivery and budget management will form the basis for overall improved performance standards.”<sup>16</sup> The draft Strategy is currently undergoing consultations and is expected to be approved for operationalization in 2020.<sup>17</sup>

The [Governance Thematic Group](#) is primarily responsible for managing the implementation of GACAP II and the larger mandate of promoting governance issues in ADB’s operations and projects through “hands-on analytical and advisory support,

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> ADB (2013) *Second Governance and Anticorruption Action Plan (GACAP II)*. Accessed at: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/34110/files/gacap-ii-implementation-review.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Strategy 2030 sets the broad direction for ADB operations with guiding principles that call for the provision of integrated solutions, combining expertise across a range of sectors, a country-focused approach tailored to specific local circumstances, and use of innovative technologies across ADB operations.

ADB. “Strategy 2030: Achieving a Prosperous, Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific.” Accessed at: <https://www.adb.org/documents/strategy-2030-prosperous-inclusive-resilient-sustainable-asia-pacific>

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> ADB (2018) *Draft Strategy 2030 Operational Plans Operational Priority 6: Strengthening Governance and Institutional Capacity, 2019–2024*. Accessed at: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/495976/strategy-2030-op6-20180408.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> ADB “Strategy 2030: Achieving a Prosperous, Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific.” Accessed at: <https://www.adb.org/documents/strategy-2030-prosperous-inclusive-resilient-sustainable-asia-pacific>

peer review, and knowledge and innovative solutions.” It is comprised of about 200 “in-house” experts on governance and related issues and serves as the institutional platform for “knowledge sharing, cross-departmental coordination, peer review, learning, and links to external networks and partners.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> ADB. “Governance Thematic Group.” Accessed at: <https://www.adb.org/sectors/governance/overview/thematic-group>



**ANNEX IV:  
MONITORING THE  
GOVERNANCE- RELATED  
TARGETS IN SDG 16**

## KEY GLOBAL ACTORS, PROCESSES, AND SOURCES

Because of the breadth and complexity of Agenda 2030, continuous monitoring of progress and achievements is imperative. Recognizing this, the United Nations (UN) and its partners have established comprehensive policies and mechanisms for monitoring SDG implementation and refinement of the detailed indicators used globally to measure progress towards the individual Targets. Since the Goals do not represent a contractual, legally binding commitment by individual countries within the UN, implementation and monitoring at the national, provincial and local level is essentially voluntary. However, it is likely that a legally voluntary action – SDG implementation reporting – may become politically imperative.<sup>19</sup>

At the apex, the UN Secretary-General produces an annual report on the SDGs, covering each of the Goals. Because of the breadth of Agenda 2030, the UN report is necessarily global, limited and selective. Peer review of country performance, with inputs by the private sector and civil society, is intended to encourage and inform action on the SDGs by individual countries. Thus the UN has established a system of voluntary reviews undertaken at the national level (VNRs). The VNRs are presented and discussed at an annual [High Level Political Forum \(HLPF\)](#) led by the presidents of the [UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council \(ECOSOC\)](#).

The HLPF, held in New York City in July, has become the key global occasion for reporting progress and problems, with careful orchestration of country presentations and large numbers of side events and informal contacts. Agenda 2030 foresees non-governmental engagement in the HLPF. The private sector and civil society are gradually gaining in importance, and may submit documents. Side events under NGO leadership are a feature. Occasionally, private sector personnel, CSOs and parliamentarians are included in country delegations to the HLPF. Major groups and stakeholders have commented and asked questions during VNR presentations.

In 2016, 28 countries conducted VNRs and presented their reports to the HLPF. In 2017 the number increased to 43. At the 2018 HLPF 46 countries submitted VNRs. Each year a limited number of the SDGs is selected for special emphasis in the VNRs discussed at the HLPF. SDG16 will first receive special attention in 2019. In any case, most of the country reports address the entirety of the Goals. A recent innovation carries the reporting to the UN beyond the country level: In 2018 New York City presentation a

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<sup>19</sup> A shift from legally voluntary to politically required comparable to what is envisaged here for the SDGs has occurred with the country participation in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) conducted periodically of country performance on human rights by the UN Human Rights Council.

Voluntary Local Report (VLR) at the HLPF. In addition to its global report, the UN prepares a synthesis report on the VNRs.

Based at the [University of Oxford](#), with multiple media partners, the [Our World in Data](#) database includes a so-called SDG tracker. The tracker presents research and visualizations on each of the SDG Goals, Targets and Indicators. Started in 2016, the SDG tracker was updated and revised in 2018. The site includes data going beyond the official indicators and invites users to complete a feedback form to draw the SDG trackers' sponsors attention to additional data sources considered relevant.<sup>20</sup> A separate site within *Our World in Data* devoted exclusively to corruption contains comprehensive, country-specific data and visualizations on a variety of different ways of measuring corruption. It draws upon information from Transparency International, the World Bank, OECD, and other sources.<sup>21</sup> Our World in Data is an extremely good place to start for those concerned to examine governance and corruption data.

SDG16 represents the most dramatic addition to the development agenda in Agenda 2030. Thus, it is not surprising that a number of specialized institutions and processes have been established to deepen SDG16 follow-up and review. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Norway have established an [Oslo Governance Center](#) and a Global Alliance for Reporting Progress on Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies. Opening a 2017 meeting of the Alliance, the Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs spoke on the importance of SDG16 as the cornerstone of Agenda 2030 and the need for reliable networks of expertise effectively to monitor and report on it. Prior to the meeting of the Global Alliance, the Oslo Center sponsored a civil society meeting on monitoring and reporting progress.

Not long after adoption of the SDGs, a group of stakeholders came together to promote SDG16 and associated actions under a new label: SDG16+. [The Pathfinders for SDG16+](#) are a group of UN member states, international organizations, global partnerships, and other partners working to accelerate delivery of the SDG targets for peace, justice and inclusion - SDG16+. The group is led by Brazil, Sierra Leone, and Switzerland and co-convened by the [New York University Center on International Cooperation \(CIC\)](#). It includes the [Transparency, Accountability and Participation \(TAP\) Network](#). A related entity, the [SDG16+ Forum](#), is hosted by the [World Federation of UN Associations](#) as a partnership of Denmark, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Sweden, the

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<sup>20</sup>Ritchie, Roser, Mispy, Ortiz-Ospina. "Measuring progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals." *SDG-Tracker.org, website* (2018).

<sup>21</sup> Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban and Max Roser (2016) "Corruption." Our World in Data. Accessed at: <https://ourworldindata.org/corruption>

Republic of Korea, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia. Since its inception, the 16+ Forum has grown to include Australia, the Czech Republic, Costa Rica, Georgia and Peru. The 16+ Forum provides a platform to share best practices, while applying SDG16+ as a lynchpin from which to explore and strengthen interlinkages across the entire 2030 Agenda.

Discussions are under way on the creation of a public Registry of Voluntary Commitments for SDG implementation, as a vehicle to inspire further action by governments and other entities. The idea is inspired by the success of a registry created at a recent UN conference on oceans, which now has thousands of commitments.

The UNDP has taken a leading role in the global dialogue on SDG16 implementation and monitoring. Beyond its country presence throughout developing and emerging market countries, UNDP has created an SDG16 Hub, to “capture knowledge about experience with SDG16 and drive collaboration for impact.”<sup>22</sup> The Hub provides guidance and tools to assist stakeholders in SDG implementation, and its website calls specifically for reviewing national policies on SDG targets, including the fight against corruption. The Hub is practitioner-driven and is intended to help people seeking knowledge on SDG16 and desiring to engage with others on the SDG16 agenda. Governance is one of six ‘Signature Solutions’ offered by UNDP and flagged on its website. This suggests UNDP may serve as a point of entry for CSOs in developing and emerging market countries seeking partners and support in SDG16 implementation and monitoring.

## **STRENGTHENING THE DATA FOR MEASURING PROGRESS UNDER SDG16**

The idea of a “data revolution” for sustainable development arose early in the discussions on what was to become the SDGs. In 2014 the UN Secretary General named an “[Independent Expert Advisory Group on the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development](#).” Strengthening data systems, especially national statistical offices, is foreseen under SDG 17. The 2030 Agenda also states that it will “promote transparent and accountable scaling-up of appropriate public-private cooperation to exploit the contribution to be made by a wide range of data.”<sup>23</sup> Indeed this presents solid justification for collaboration with outside and ‘unofficial’ data sources. As data on peace, justice and the effectiveness of institutions is a relatively new area of

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<sup>22</sup> SDG16 Hub. “About the SDG16 Hub: Capturing Knowledge and Driving Collaboration for SDG16 Impact.” Accessed at: <https://www.sdg16hub.org/about>

<sup>23</sup> 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

engagement, SDG16 monitoring and reporting is a domain of important potential for partnerships and use of ‘unofficial’ data.

Measuring progress on governance has proved to be an especially difficult challenge. Recognizing this, the UN Statistical Commission formed the [Praia Group on Governance Statistics](#) in March 2015. The Group was constituted to “address the issues of conceptualization, methodology and instruments in the domain of governance statistics” and to “develop regional and national statistical capacities for measuring peace, rule of law and governance.”<sup>24</sup> The Praia Group is comprised of 38 member countries, international agencies, academia, research groups, and CSOs. It serves both as a forum to share expertise and as a mechanism to develop methodological guidelines and evaluate proposed practices. The Praia Group has been tasked with developing a Handbook on governance statistics by March 2020. It is to outline “the conceptualization, measurement methodology and dissemination of governance statistics”.<sup>25</sup>

Going beyond the SDG16 indicators cited above, UNDP has convened a Virtual Network for the Development of Indicators for Goal 16. The Virtual Network brings together governance experts, development practitioners, statisticians, UN agencies and CSOs for their input into both global and national monitoring frameworks. In 2015, the Virtual Network produced a report entitled [Goal 16 – The Indicators We Want](#), to inform the work of others, including the Praia Group and National Statistics Offices. The report acknowledged that the complexity of measuring governance means that “any global indicator would be insufficient to measure the targets fully” and identifies “supplementary indicators for each target that could “round out” indicator selection processes at the national level” that can better represent meaningful progress in a given country context.”<sup>26</sup>

The SDG16 indicators are particularly hard to quantify. The production of data on governance indicators is a relatively new field and many states will need new systems

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<sup>24</sup>United Nations Statistical Commission, Praia Group on Governance Statistics, Accessed at: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/citygroups/praiacshtml>

<sup>25</sup> Package Leaflet: Understand the Praia Group Better, National Institute of Statistics of Cape Verde (INE-CV), December 2016. Accessed at: [http://ine.cv/praiagroup/LinkDocuments/Link%208\\_texto%20folheto\\_Praia\\_Grupo\\_Eng\\_near%20final\\_170111.pdf](http://ine.cv/praiagroup/LinkDocuments/Link%208_texto%20folheto_Praia_Grupo_Eng_near%20final_170111.pdf)

<sup>26</sup>Goal 16 – The Indicators We Want: Virtual Network Sourcebook on Measuring Peace, Justice and Effective Institutions, UNDP, 2015. Accessed at: <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Virtual%20Network%20on%20Goal%2016%20indicators%20-%20Indicators%20we%20want%20Report.pdf>

to collect this information. Furthermore, conflicts of interest affecting government reports on corruption have made reporting on SDG16 particularly challenging. Thus, the inclusion of unofficial reporting is needed to supplement official reporting where existing data is insufficient, to improve accuracy and validate official data, and to develop innovative new methods to measure complex and sensitive societal trends.

A new “[SDG16 Data Initiative](#)” has been established. It is a collaborative effort by a number of NGOs to review and publish available SDG16 data from both official and unofficial sources. The SDG Data Initiative added the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index to the two indicators of personal and business experience of bribery set out above. The result is a global index of all SDG16 Targets and Indicators.

In early 2018 the [Institute for Economics and Peace \(IEP\)](#) released a study focused exclusively on SDG16 metrics.<sup>27</sup> The Institute found that Goal 16 can now be measured with sufficient accuracy to determine progress, although with many limitations relating to data availability, reliability, timeliness and objectivity. Going beyond the key governance indicators set out above, IEP found that 15 of the 23 Goal 16 indicators can be measured by existing sources, and that the remaining ones can be measured by proxy indicators. The study underscored a need for third-party observers to fill data gaps and serve as independent verifiers of SDG16 results. The Institute recommended that independent third parties provide complementary support to national statistical offices.<sup>28</sup> One problem with this approach is that the more use is made of proxies, the less will be the comparability of SDG16 (and other SDG) reporting across countries; regional and global compilations risk being impossible.

Another non-profit partnership, [Global Policy Watch](#), found in 2018 that the focus of efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda is shifting from identifying the global indicator framework to national-level capacity building. It sensed an apparent disconnect between the indicator measurement process and the UN’s high-level political forum (HLPF) review process. Thus, UN member states and CSOs were seen to be confronted

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<sup>27</sup> From Now to 2030: What is Needed to Measure Goal 16.

Accessed at: <http://www.data4sdgs.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/From%20Now%20to%202030%20-%20What%20is%20Needed%20to%20Measure%20Goal%2016.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> One such activity reported by IEP is the research organizations and networks that will measure and publish reports on Goal 16 using available data. The grouping includes the Global Forum for Media Development, Saferworld, the Institute for Economics and Peace, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Namati, Open Society Foundations, PRIO, Results for Development Institute, the Small Arms Survey, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Transparency International, the Transparency, Accountability and Participation Network and the World Justice Project.

with two parallel processes: The HLPF has a multi-year program of work to review clusters of the SDGs at the same time as indicators are being refined. This makes engagement in SDG monitoring challenging for CSOs: Should they devote their energies to better indicators or to the HLPF process?<sup>29</sup>

The private sector can make important contributions to good governance implementation and monitoring under SDG16. The UN's Global Compact principles state that "Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery." The Compact challenges companies to join peers, governments, UN agencies and civil society to realize a more transparent global economy. The Compact foresees collective action, pointing out: "One company's actions, while critical, are not enough to end corruption. Companies must join forces with governments, community-based organizations, NGOs and other businesses to act collectively against corruption."<sup>30</sup>

Companies may also have access to data, facilitate data collection, or otherwise provide technical or logistical support for data collection. This can help fill gaps or provide parallel reporting where there may be a question about the capability of the government to provide unbiased data, such as in the case of corruption statistics. A research report on *The Role of the Private Sector In Support of Reporting Under SDG16* released in March 2018 observed that 86% of large companies surveyed noted at least one indicator where they have existing data to contribute, particularly on issues such as representativeness, expenditures, and public access to information.<sup>31</sup> However, without clear frameworks on how to share it, this data generally goes unused by official sources.

## OVERVIEW OF INITIAL UN AND VNR REPORTING ON SDG16

**Reporting at the global level.** The UN Secretary-General's 2017 report on the SDGs is only general on governance issues. It notes that "progress in promoting peace and justice, and in building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions remains

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
<sup>29</sup> Adams, Barbara and Karen Judd "The Ups and Downs of Tiers: Measuring SDG Progress." Global Policy Watch. Accessed at: <https://www.globalpolicywatch.org/blog/2018/04/26/tiers-measuring-sdg-progress/>

<sup>30</sup>United Nations Global Compact. "Eliminate corruption to build sustainable, inclusive and transparent societies." Accessed at: <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work/governance/anti-corruption>

<sup>31</sup>Seyle, Conor (2018), "The Role of The Private Sector in Support of Reporting Under SDG16" Global Alliance for Reporting Progress on Promoting Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies. Accessed at: [http://oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Private\\_Sector\\_Role\\_SDG16\\_Report%20R2.pdf](http://oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Private_Sector_Role_SDG16_Report%20R2.pdf)

uneven across and within regions.”<sup>32</sup>Regarding corruption, the UN reports without country specificity that “firms in low-income countries are confronted by more bribery requests than those in richer countries,” and observes that “opaque, burdensome, and inefficient regulations and procedures provide a ‘cover’ in which corrupt officials are able to extract bribes.”<sup>33</sup>The 2018 UN report states: “Globally, almost one out of five firms are exposed to a bribe request when dealing with regulatory and utility transactions, with a regional variation from fewer than 10 per cent of firms in North America and Latin America and the Caribbean to 28 per cent in Central Asia and Southern Asia and in Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia.”<sup>34</sup>

Regarding freedom of information, the UN’s 2016 report provides some information (see chart). In his 2017 report the UN Secretary-general observes that “more countries have adopted freedom of information legislation, but implementation lags behind.” More specifically, his report states: “In around 40 percent of countries with freedom-of-




information laws in place, the public may not be aware of their existence.” The UN’s 2018 report states that “Freedom of Information laws and policies have been adopted by 116 countries, with at least 25 countries doing so over the last five years. However, implementation remains a challenge.” This suggests that there may be fertile terrain

<sup>32</sup> United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2017.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> UN document E/2018/64

for significant expansion of demand-side approaches to good governance and right to information initiatives.



The 2018 UN report only briefly addresses good governance. It observes that “advances in promoting the *rule of law* are uneven. However, progress is being made in regulations to promote *public access to information*, albeit slowly.”

Except at the highest level of generality, and aside from one reference to “anti-corruption” being mentioned in VNRs, the UN’s synthesis report on the full set of 2017 VNRs does not address corruption. It states that in discussing next steps countries “stressed the need for the development of effective and inclusive governance institutions and processes, consolidation of the rule of law, strengthening of the justice sector, and the evolution of an informed civil society.”<sup>35</sup> The 2018 synthesis report states that some of the challenges in realizing SDG16 include corruption, as cited by the Bahamas, Mexico, Slovakia, and Sri Lanka.<sup>36</sup>

**Reporting at the Country Level: The Individual VNRs.** Reviewing individual country VNRs proves thus far to be remarkably uninformative for substantial examination of governance and corruption issues at the country level. Nonetheless, a few nuggets

<sup>35</sup> 2017 Voluntary National Reviews, Synthesis Report for High Level Political Forum, pg. 26. Accessed at: [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/17109Synthesis\\_Report\\_VNRs\\_2017.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/17109Synthesis_Report_VNRs_2017.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, page 59.

stand out. Ignoring the internationally agreed indicators for measurement of corruption under Target 16.5, the 2017 VNR for Thailand states: "To combat corruption is another national priority agenda which the Royal Thai Government has multiplied efforts through structural reforms of all relevant agencies." Benin is a notable exception to the pattern of avoiding the issue of corruption in its 2017 VNR: In a remarkable example of openness, the Benin VNR, prepared in cooperation with UNDP and FAO, states that the Benin National Integrity System 2016 evaluation "revealed that systematic corruption has established itself, is tolerated in the country and constitutes a real brake on the delivery of quality public services and the reduction of poverty." The VNR finds that the establishment of good governance at all levels constitutes an "essential lever" for sustainable development. The 2018 VNR for Guinea is also a striking exception, in recognizing that corruption is widespread. It reports a survey which found that 96% of the population felt the absence of sanction on civil servants was the principal cause of corruption in the country. It also reports that the authorities lost the equivalent of more than \$70 million due to corruption. The 2018 Laos VNR reports only the initiation of an anti-corruption drive and the country's position on the TI index. The 2018 Lebanon, Australia, and Romania VNRs do not refer to corruption. Egypt's 2018 VNR refers to corruption only by citing the country's TI country perception index. The 2018 VNR for Sri Lanka reports that the country performs poorly on corruption and bribery, and cites TI perception data. The 2018 VNR of Vietnam states that the biggest sociological survey in Viet Nam - focusing on capturing the provincial performance in governance, policy implementation and public service delivery - mentions improvement in "Accountability" and "Control of Corruption in the Public Sector," without any specificity.

It is not surprising that countries have thus far tended to give little critical information in their VNR reports on reduction of corruption and bribery of the kind foreseen by the SDG16 corruption indicators, since government officials can hardly be expected to engage in vigorous self-criticism in documents submitted for global public scrutiny. It appears that UNDP plays a major role in the financing of large numbers of individual country reports, and thus could have an important role, globally as well as at the country level, in their design.



# **ANNEX V:**

## **COMPARISON OF MDB POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT**

A comparison of CSO engagement policies procedures and institutional arrangements is presented in the following table for the: [Asian Development Bank \(ADB\)](#), [World Bank](#) and [International Finance Corporation \(WB/IFC\)](#), [Inter-American Development Bank \(IDB\)](#), [African Development Bank \(AfDB\)](#), and [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development \(EBRD\)](#).

The following insights are highlighted based on the table:

- All MDBs have policies and systems for cooperation and dialogue with CSOs.
- Safeguard policies of MDBs' mandate consultation with the affected communities. This usually involves engagement with CSOs.
- All MDBs have guidance materials for staff and implementing agencies on consultations.
- All MDBs include NGOs, faith-based organizations, foundations, community-based organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, labor organizations, and business association in their definition of CSOs. AfDB is unique in including independent media.
- Information sharing (driven by access to information policies), consultation, institutional dialogue, collaboration and partnerships constitute different levels of CSO engagement. All MDBs recognize this except EBRD.
- The WB adopted a citizen engagement strategy in 2014 that sets it apart from the other MDBs in terms of depth and breadth of CSO engagement in its operations.
- The WB and ADB have well developed monitoring and reporting systems particularly at the project approval stage. IFC has a good system for reporting on implementation progress and the WB will soon start reporting on it as well. The ADB does not have an implementation progress reporting system.
- CSOs can participate in the procurement of goods and services (particularly consulting services) but they have to compete with 'for-profit commercial companies'. No MDB has procurement guidelines specifically designed for the 'not-for-profit CSO sector'.
- Grants for CSOs is occasionally available in varying amounts, usually under trusts managed by MDBs, e.g. the [Global Partnership for Social Accountability](#) at the WB and the [CSO Capacity Enhancement Framework](#) at the EBRD.
- All MDBs have established a CSO/NGO engagement unit at the corporate level with varying staff numbers. The WB has the largest team at corporate level. Beyond the corporate unit the staffing varies and comprises mostly part-time staff at regional and local (field) office levels.

ADB	World Bank/IFC	IDB	AfDB	EBRD
<b>Guiding Policy</b>				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bank Policy (BP) /Operational Policy (OP) on: "Promotion of Co-operation with Nongovernment Organizations" (ADB Operations Manual).</li> <li>2. BP/OP on: "Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations".</li> <li>3. BP on "Public Communications".</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Guidance Note on Multi-Stakeholder Engagement</li> <li>2. Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in World Bank Group Operations</li> <li>3. Bank Policy (BP) on Access to Information</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. IDB does not appear to have a specific <a href="#">operations policy</a> on engaging with CSOs.</li> <li>2. IDB carried out a comprehensive review of <a href="#">CSO engagement</a> in all 26 countries. It found that CSO engagement is taking place at all levels and in all countries but at varying rates.</li> <li>3. It is planning to prepare a CSO engagement framework in 2016-17.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Framework for Enhanced Engagement With Civil Society Organizations (July 2012).</li> <li>2. The 2014 revised Operations Manual (OM) makes reference to the importance of consulting CSOs and NGOs, but there is no requirement to engage with them. 2010 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) guidance and 2013 project guidance make reference to consultations as a quality at entry factor.</li> <li>3. The safeguard and gender operational policies require consultations with communities and local stakeholders.</li> </ol>	<p>Public Information Policy (PIP)</p> <p>Environmental and Social policy</p> <p>CSO Capacity Enhancement Framework</p>

Operational Guides (Publications)				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. CSO Sourcebook: A Staff Guide to Cooperation with CSOs.</li> <li>2. ADB Guide to Participation</li> <li>3. Working With ADB: A Primer for Identifying Business Opportunities for NGOs.</li> <li>4. Fostering Better Communications and Participation In Projects</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Involving NGOs in Bank Supported Activities (Good Practice Note)</li> <li>2. Consultations With Civil Society: A Sourcebook</li> <li>3. Consultations with CSOs – General Guidelines for World Bank Staff.</li> </ol>	Public consultations with civil society: Guidelines for Public Private Executing Agencies.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. An Action Plan is being developed to refresh and implement this Framework,</li> <li>2. A Guidance Note on Consultations complements the Integrated Safeguards System.</li> </ol>	Rules of Procedure of the Project Complaint Mechanism
Definition of Civil Society				
ADB defines CSOs as “nongovernment organizations (NGOs), community-based groups or organizations, trade unions, research institutions, or foundations	In the World Bank Group Citizen Engagement Strategy the term ‘citizens’ refers to individuals as well as civil society organizations outside the public or non-profit sector, such as NGOs, charitable organizations, faith based organizations, foundations, academia, associations, policy development and research institutes, trade unions and social movements.	IDB defines Civil Society as a wide array of organizations, associations; academic institutions; universities, not-for-profit professional responsibility groups and non-governmental and not-for profit social organizations; trade unions; foundations; faith-based institutions; formal and informal organizations which belong to or represent community interests.	The 2012 Framework refers to CSOs in a broad sense, indicating that “ the myriad of civic organizations in civil society include, but are not limited to, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), people's and professional organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, consumer and human rights groups, women's associations, youth clubs, independent radio, television, print and electronic media, neighborhood or	For EBRD, civil society includes professional non-governmental organizations (NGOs), policy and research think tanks, social movements, labor unions, community-based organizations, women’s groups, business development organizations and other socio-economic and labor-market actors, including individual activists.

			community-based coalitions, religious groups, academic and research institutions, grassroots movements and organizations of indigenous peoples.”	
<b>Levels of CSO Engagement</b>				
<p>ADB uses four levels of CSO engagement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Information gathering and sharing.</li> <li>2. Consultation</li> <li>3. Collaboration</li> <li>4. Partnerships</li> </ol> <p>The definitions are provided below.</p>	<p>The World Bank Citizen Engagement (CE) activities include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Consultation</li> <li>2. Collaboration</li> <li>3. Grievance Redress</li> <li>4. Citizen led monitoring</li> <li>5. Empowerment</li> </ol> <p>Descriptions are provided below.</p>	<p>IDB uses five levels of civil society engagement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Information</li> <li>2. Public consultations</li> <li>3. Collaboration</li> <li>4. Partnership</li> <li>5. Dialogue</li> </ol> <p>Descriptions are provided below.</p>	<p>The Framework proposes that AfDB will proactively reach out to CSOs, structuring the AfDB’s engagement with CSOs through three dimensions—outreach, dialogue, and partnership—and carry it out at three tiers - corporate, regional/country, and project levels.</p>	<p>EBRD is engaged in an ongoing dialogue with civil society focuses on human rights and democracy, on environmental and social issues, economic inclusion and gender, transparency and business development issues related to EBRD operations.</p>
<p>Information gathering and sharing: Information is (i) generated by ADB/recipient/client and shared with stakeholders; (ii) independently generated by stakeholders and shared with ADB/recipient/client; or (iii) jointly produced.</p>	<p>Information sharing is considered as an enabler for CE but not CE itself. World Bank Group discloses information according to its Access to Information Policy. Governments disclose information as agreed in the loan/grant agreements and according to their own laws.</p>	<p>Information– This refers to actions conducted by the Bank in order to distribute and/or disseminate documents and les regarding its projects, initiatives and policies, including the initiatives to strengthen information access issues (including the Access To Information policy) and open data.</p>	<p>It further articulates intentions to: a) expand the range of CSOs with which AfDB works and develop criteria for those CSOs; b) provide support to build CSOs’ capacities and strengthen efforts to involve CSOs in the specific areas of environment and social safeguards, the Independent Review Mechanism (IRM) and</p>	<p>Providing information on project complaint mechanism: raise awareness and understanding of the mechanism, and wherever possible to streamline administrative processes to ease the burden for CSOs.</p>

<p>Consultation: Stakeholder input is requested and considered as part of an inclusive policy, program, or project decision-making process.</p>	<p>Consultations with citizens and CSOs in design and implementation of development policies, programs and projects.</p>	<p>Public consultations– This refers to the participation of different sectors of civil society who provide comments and suggestions about development policies, projects, strategies and programs.</p>	<p>Fragile Countries; c) develop CSO portals on AfDB’s internal and external website; d) consolidate the institutional anchor in charge of civil society within the Bank; establish a network of CSO focal points across the organization; and revive the AfDB/CSO Committee; and e) follow-up approval of the Framework by: i) internal dissemination sessions; ii) a full assessment of AfDB’s experience with CSOs; iii) development of a benchmarking exercise highlighting best practice and an action plan specifying priorities for future engagement; and iv) establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system.</p>	<p>Public consultations with CSOs on draft EBRD policies and strategies that are under review (e.g. on First EBRD’s Gender Strategy) <a href="http://www.ebrd.com/strategies-and-policies/have-your-say.html">www.ebrd.com/strategies-and-policies/have-your-say.html</a>  Discussions with CSOs on local Bank-financed projects (e.g. round table on engaging civil society to promote transparent Procurement)</p>
<p>Collaboration: Stakeholder input is requested and considered as part of an inclusive policy, program, or project decision-making process.</p>	<p>Collaboration in decision-making, data collection and follow-up on perspectives, evaluations or recommendations.</p>	<p>Collaboration – This refers to the cooperation between CSOs and specialists/experts in seminars, publications on specific topics, technical exchanges in workshops, face-to-face or online training sessions, and thematic roundtables with CSOs acting either as providers or beneficiaries.</p>		<p>Cooperation with CSOs in selected areas</p>

<p>Partnerships: Stakeholders and ADB/ recipient/client work jointly, but stakeholders have limited control over decision-making and resources.</p>	<p>Social inclusion and Empowerment. Refers to empowerment of citizens with resources and authority over their use. Citizen and</p>	<p>Partnership – This refers to the involvement of CSOs in the creation of knowledge products and/ or the implementation of project components and/or TCs jointly with Bank operation or sector specialists. It also includes social awareness campaigns carried out by CSOs.</p>		
<p>Grievance Redress Mechanisms – part of safeguard policies.</p>	<p>Grievance Redress Mechanisms – part of safeguard policies and considered CE.</p>	<p>Grievance Redress Mechanisms – part of safeguard policies.</p>		<p>Project Complaint Mechanism provides people, as well as civil society organisations, who are, or who are likely to be adversely impacted by an EBRD project, a means of raising social and environmental concerns with the bank, independently from banking operations.</p>
	<p>Citizen-led monitoring And oversight.</p>	<p>.</p>		

<p>Dialogue- ADB carries out extensive dialogue with CSOs during the Annual Meetings and on all major institutional policies and knowledge products. Dialogue is also organized at regional, sector and country levels.</p>	<p>Dialogue- World Bank carries out extensive dialogue with CSOs during the Annual Meetings and Spring Meetings and on all major institutional policies and knowledge products. Dialogue is also organized at regional, sector and country levels.</p> <p><u>IFC</u>: Stakeholder engagement defined as Information dissemination, disclosure, consultation and participation processes, including grievance mechanisms</p>	<p>Dialogue – This refers to the participation and exchange of CSOs with Government/Private Sector representatives and/or Bank specialists during ConSoC Meetings, Annual Meetings, Regional Forums and/or Trans-boundary Meetings organized by or with participation of the IDB. In November 2010 IDB will hold its <a href="#">XVI Annual Meeting IDB Group-Civil Society</a>. IDB also runs a <a href="#">Civil Society Knowledge Building Program</a> through Webinars.</p>	<p>AfDB holds an annual CSO Forum at the time of the Annual Meetings. The most recent took place In Lusaka in May 2016. There is also an AfDB-CSO Committee, which met twice in 2015 and in May 2016. The Committee’s TORs are being revised in consultation with civil society. Eleven field offices have held Open Days with civil society. AfDB also consults with civil society on major policy documents. Currently, AfDB is holding a series of 5 Regional Consultations in the second half of 2016 to convey information on AfDB’s mandate and activities, and to seek inputs for the planned elaboration of an Action Plan for strengthening engagement with civil society and a refreshing of the 2012 Framework.</p>	<p>Dialogue: Civil Society Programme</p> <p>1. Annual Meeting – There CSOs engaged in a dialogue with the Bank about its investment projects, policies and strategies, and participated in multi-stakeholder discussions on role of civil society in transition, transparency in public procurement, youth, skills and economic inclusion and gender equality.</p> <p>2. EBRD Board Directors met with civil society Organisations in the countries EBRD is working in.</p>
<b>Monitoring/Result Framework</b>				
<p>The Corporate Results Framework includes one Results Framework Indicator (RFI) and 4 Standard Explanatory</p>	<p>The World Bank Presidential Delivery Unit reports on the following citizen engagement</p>	<p>No indicators for CSO engagement are apparent in the <a href="#">corporate results framework</a>.</p>	<p>1. AfDB <a href="#">corporate results framework</a> contains no indicators to measure</p>	

<p>Data Indicators (SEDI) related to ADB engagement with CSOs.</p> <p>RFI: CSO participation in sovereign operations (% of approved operations).</p> <p>SEDIs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. [Actual] Civil society organization participation in the design of sovereign operations (% of approved operations)</li> <li>2. operations (% of approved operations)</li> <li>3. [Planned] CSO participation in sovereign operations (% of approved operations) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Design stage</li> <li>b. Implementation stage</li> <li>c. Design and implementation stages</li> </ol> </li> <li>4. Country partnership strategies (CPS) with CSO action plan approved (Number).</li> </ol>	<p>indicators. The Indicators are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Projects with beneficiary feedback indicator at design (%)</li> <li>2. Projects including citizen oriented design (%)</li> <li>3. Beneficiary feedback indicator at implementation</li> <li>4. Resolved registered grievances (%)</li> </ol> <p>“Beneficiaries” are defined as a subset of citizens directly targeted by and expected to benefit from the development project.</p> <p>IFC: See footnote<sup>37</sup></p>		<p>engagement with CSOs.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. An M&amp;E framework was to have been developed as part of next steps after 2012 Framework approved, but not yet accomplished.</li> <li>3. AfDB is in the process of updating its civil society engagement strategy that would include monitoring indicators.</li> </ol>	
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<sup>37</sup> IFC: 0%=No stakeholder engagement; 20%= some public events, limited ongoing engagement process. Grievance mechanism is being implemented; 40%=Stakeholders have been identified and there were several events with effective dialogue; Grievance mechanism is fully implemented however there is not enough evidence of its effectiveness. Applicable consultation processes have been implemented; 60%=Multiple and ongoing public consultation and participation in a culturally appropriate manner. Stakeholders’ feedback is actively considered; reporting to communities; effective grievance mechanism is evidenced by formal records; 80%=Multiple and ongoing public consultation and participation in a culturally appropriate manner. Stakeholders’ feedback is actively considered; reporting to communities; effective grievance mechanism is evidenced by formal records; 100% = Stakeholders’ engagement is part of the regular project activities. Affected communities’ issues and concerns are proactively addressed. The project has built fluent and inclusive communication and consultation process with its stakeholders.

5. Co-financing of ADB operations and technical assistance projects with CSOs (%).				
<b>Funding of CSOs- Grants &amp; Loans</b>				
Direct funding for CSOs from ADB is available from grants programs managed by ADB e.g. TA Grants, Japan Poverty Reduction Fund and other Trust funds.	Direct grant funding for CSOs is available from <a href="#">many funding mechanisms</a> managed by the World Bank such as the <a href="#">Global Partnership for Social Accountability</a>	Information awaited.	NGOs can bid under AfDB financed projects for relevant contracts.	EBRD is funding CSOs in a grant-based programme that currently includes four completed technical cooperation projects and eight projects under implementation in the early transition countries, the Western Balkans, the southern and eastern Mediterranean (SEMED) region as well as in Turkey and Ukraine. The total budget for active and completed projects is approximately €2.2 million, focusing on three key areas: sustainable energy and resources, economic inclusion, and good governance and transparency.



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